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

Untitled (2022)

Dear reader,

I am delighted to write this foreword for another issue of Utah Valley University's undergraduate philosophy journal Sophia. An undergrad journal is a beautiful thing. It's a place to experiment in thought and it's a place where, sometimes, we can get glimpses into the future of academic discourse. It is, maybe above all, a space where students get to be genuinely part of the academic community, in this case the community of professional philosophers. While a classroom generally only asks students to take responsibility for their own work, working at an undergraduate journal means taking responsibility for others' work and for the broader community of philosophers. This community could not sustain itself without so much unpaid and often unacknowledged work of people organizing, designing, communicating, planning, scheduling, reading, writing, or editing. Producing yet another issue of this journal is a public service to the discipline. Everyone who contributed to this journal – everyone who submitted, the authors and the editors – is passionate about thinking philosophically together, and the editing team in particular has worked very hard to provide a communal space to do so. In this spirit, I want to thank everyone who submitted, the authors featured here as well as the entire editing team.

Warmest regards,

Thomas H. Bretz
Faculty Advisor for ***Sophia***

A Strange Art Show

By
Zachary Bright

In this paper, I argue that zoos violate an idiosyncratic normative principle: one should generally allow someone to live authentically. The violation of this principle degrades the aesthetic experience between person and animal at zoos. To argue this, I first attempt to establish a meaningful and communicative relationship between human and animal via the dialogical method. This method permits us to have general insight on the animal's preferences. Such insight is key to understanding the preferences of animals in zoos because these animals are placed in a false-nature. By engaging with the animals (via the dialogical method), the animal informs us that we are violating their authenticity i.e., the normative principle is violated. As a result, the aesthetic experience of the zoo becomes degraded. In addition to what the animals communicate to us, from a descriptive standpoint it appears that human status becomes inappropriately bolstered with regard to the animals in zoos. This marginalization degrades the aesthetic experience because we are not meeting the animals authentically. In other words, the normative principle is violated. I conclude that there are more ethical alternatives to zoos that would facilitate a better aesthetic experience while respecting the normative principle.

This paper utilizes phenomenological methods to analyze the aesthetic experiences at zoos. As such, there are several anecdotes used. These anecdotes are meant to draw on the experience that we have at zoos while trying to parse out the experience from our biases. There may be countering experiences than the ones I have used, but I have hoped to acknowledge the general experiences humans have at zoos.

I. Introduction

Zoos facilitate a unique human to animal interaction. The interaction is unique, in part, because approaching an animal in its natural habitat rarely occurs for humans. Furthermore, some interactions that would normally be inaccessible to humans due to environmental differences or safety concerns become accessible because of zoos. On a personal note, as a child, I often went to the zoo. My weekly zoo trips instilled in me such a deep love for animals that I wanted to be a zookeeper.[1] As an aspiring zookeeper, I wanted to take care of the chimpanzees. I was mesmerized by chimpanzees as they walked and played around their jungle playground behind a glass wall. What attracted me to this animal? Good question. It could have been their cheeky smiles when I would incessantly tap the glass dividing me and the chimpanzee, or perhaps it was their childlike mischievousness. One time, there was a chimpanzee that imitated everything I did. It was as if there was a real friendship forming between me and this chimpanzee. These are all plausible answers to my attraction to chimpanzees. But what attracts any of us to animals? An even better question. It seems the aesthetic appeal of animals causes this attraction.[2] This aesthetic appeal of animals is a wonderful part of human experience we enjoy in our contemporary society. The primary medium by which we achieve this experience is zoos. Before diving into the argument, let me briefly clarify what I mean by "the aesthetic appeal of animals."

The aesthetic appeal of animals has two parts. The first part of the aesthetic appeal of animal's is their intrinsic value. I assume animals have an intrinsic value which requires humans to have some baseline of respect, regardless of their potential or actual capacities. For example, a baby cannot communicate, act rationally, be held morally responsible, etc. but has some sort of intrinsic value. Although the baby has not performed any morally praiseworthy or blameworthy action, we grant it deep respect, in part because of their intrinsic value. Animals arguably have this same intrinsic value. My pet dog has not performed any morally praiseworthy action, even with higher capacities than a baby. Regardless, I treat my dog with respect.[3] The second part of the aesthetic appeal of animals is their authenticity. I define authenticity as the ability to have control over one's life without need of superfluous external aid

1. I was discouraged from the profession, however, since zookeeping is not a lucrative career, so naturally I decided becoming a philosopher would be the more profitable route.
2. Unfortunately, my appeal to chimpanzees will have to be addressed some other time. But hopefully I will provide a partial answer in exploring the question in a generalized manner.
3. I imagine this assumption of animals having intrinsic value will be troublesome to some. This project unfortunately falls beyond the scope of this paper, however, I would ask the skeptic to consider the almost immediate wonder they, or many, experience when confronting an animal at the zoo.

and a consistent respect towards said individual's intrinsic value.

A second concept to understand is the "aesthetic experience": among two subjects, or a subject and object, there is a primary subject that feels a sense of awe, wonder, respect, or admiration upon direct or prolonged interaction with an object of value. My experiences with chimpanzees are an example of an aesthetic experience. The chimpanzees gave me a sense of awe and respect for these creatures. So powerful was the experience that I wanted to take care of them for the rest of my life. Despite this profound experience, the question I would like to explore is "What kind of aesthetic experience was
I having at zoos?"

In this paper, I will argue that zoos violate what I will call "the normative principle"—the principle which states that one should generally allow someone to live authentically—consequently degrading the aesthetic experience between person and animal. There is a lot of terminology being thrown around in this normative principle. Even "normative principle" has a lot of philosophical-jargon baggage. I will assume that normative principles constrain persons to perform some action given the proper context and independent of the agent's attitude. As such, an individual must abide by the normative principle I have articulated above regardless of their attitude towards it, e.g. one should generally allow someone to live authentically. This coincides with our moral intuitions nicely, which will be demonstrated later.

One more important clarification, we need to define authenticity. Authenticity seems to be a freedom of will internally and the ability to make effective said will by action. A whole paper could be dedicated to analyzing this claim, but put succinctly, the individual has freedom to actualize their internal evaluational judgments and desires. For example, if I valued Flappy Bird to be the highest form of past-time and formed a desire to play Flappy Bird for hours, and I ended up playing Flappy Bird for hours, I would be living authentically. This definition might still be fuzzy, but hopefully the picture is becoming a little more focused.

My paper will go as follows: first, using the dialogical method, I argue that if we could sufficiently communicate with animals, we would know if they prefer zoos to their natural environments. The dialogical method comes from Josephine Donovanand will provide some grounding for the normative principle previously mentioned. Second, zoos place animals in false-nature, thereby violating the normative principle. And since there is a violation of the normative principle, the aesthetic experience becomes degraded. Third, in addition to a degraded aesthetic experience, human status becomes inappropriately bolstered as the relationship with animals devalues. Fourth, the degraded aesthetic experience implies animal marginalization because we are not meeting the animals authentically; on their own terms.[4] I conclude by offering alternatives to zoos that would promote a better aesthetic experience and maintain the normative principle.

4. Tafalla, "The Aesthetic Appreciation of Animals in Zoological Parks.", 1.

II. The Dialogical Method

First, the dialogical method argument: If we can sufficiently communicate with animals, we can know if they prefer zoos to their natural environments. We can sufficiently communicate with animals and we can safely assume they would prefer their natural environments. In Josephine Donovan's paper "Feminism and the Treatment of Animals: From Care to Dialogue", she lists conditions for what counts as sufficient communication: "Body language, eye movement, facial expression, tone of voice...".[5] If these conditions are met, then sufficient interspecies communication is achieved. Dogs are fantastic everyday examples of effective and sufficient communication between animals and humans. Humans ask dogs if they are hungry, want to go on a walk, or how they are doing. Dogs respond by jumping up and down, wagging their tail, smiling, and other visible emotions. This everyday interspecies communication suggests that humans and dogs can sufficiently understand each other.

With the criteria outlined for how interspecies communication is possible, let's examine what zoo animals communicate to us. For visitors at zoos, observing the animals' body language is the best method by which sufficient communication can be achieved. I will use John Berger's observation of a common experience for kids visiting zoos to demonstrate that zoo animals would prefer not to be in zoos. The example goes as follows—When children visit zoo parks, there are cries of "Why isn't it moving? Where is it? Nothing is happening!"[6] The animals' fatigue and lack of enthusiasm at zoos communicates a somber message: the animals are depressed.[7] Yet, perhaps this is not the case with every animal. Sometimes animals seem to love being observed and fed without the inconvenience of finding food for themselves. True, some animals seem to love attention, but I'm doubtful most animals even have this preference. Regardless, certain animals may enjoy a zoo lifestyle, but this would still require a sincere level of communication, otherwise the animal would be living inauthentically, i.e. we would be violating the normative principle.

The dialogical method gives us a method to properly apply the normative principle—one should generally allow someone to live authentically. For if we want to be able to effectively apply the normative principle, we will need to be able to have some sort of understanding of what the animals' desires are. Once we understand these desires, we can evaluate the environments in which we place animals and determine whether the animal can fulfill these desires within said environment.

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5. Donovan, "Feminism and the Treatment of Animals: From Care to Dialogue", 2017, 45.
6. Berger, "Why Look at Animals?" *About Looking*, 1992, 23.
7. Admittedly, "depressed" and "I don't want to be here" are two different messages. But I feel, in this case, the distinction is negligible. Most possible modes by which the animal can achieve happiness (in the most non-human sense) are facilitated by the zoo, e.g. food, shelter, interspecies relationships, etc.

I would argue that zoos are not a conducive environment for this normative principle. There are, however, alternatives to zoos that have the aesthetic experience of zoos, without violating the normative principle, but these will be addressed later. As an aside, I don't think the animal's excitement over food is a strong indication of their love of zoos. Food outside the zoo may be just as good, if not better, than zoo food.[8] Overall, animals' behavior suggests that they would not prefer to live in zoos because the dialogical method allows sufficient communication to know we ate in violation of the normative principle.

III. False-Natures and Authenticity

Second, zoos place animals in false-nature, i.e. violating the normative principle, thereby degrading the aesthetic experience. I define false-nature as an enclosed environment constructed with man-made materials to provide an illusion of true-nature. A muggy swamp in a six-foot by six-foot square glass container is false-nature. The Everglades are true-nature. Empirical data shows that these false-natures have a negative impact on animals. According to Jamieson, "After a few years in captivity, animals can begin to diverge both behaviorally and genetically from their relatives in the wild."[9] These physical and emotional alterations caused by false-natures put animals in a position of limited capacity to have control over their life without need of external aid. In other words, zoos are not allowing animals to have control over their lives without need of superfluous external aid; they lack authenticity. False-nature restricts this, degrading the aesthetic experience at zoos. To demonstrate this, I will use The Truman Show as an analogous argument for why the lack of authenticity degrades the aesthetic experience.[10]

I argue that those involved, directly or indirectly, with the television show violated Truman's authenticity; Truman lacked the freedom to control his life. The Truman Show stars a man named Truman Burbank. As a child, Turman was adopted by a corporation to be raised in an extremely sophisticated dome. This dome, Seahaven, is a perfect replication of a normal suburban town. There are several houses, a beach, a blue sky, people with jobs, etc. The only differences between Seahaven and suburban towns in the real world are that it was an enclosed environment and Truman was being watched, and cared for, twenty-four hours and seven days a week.

At the beginning of the show, Truman lives a fairly normal life (it is a television show after all). He has a wife, goes to work, hangs out with friends, has dinner parties, etc. But, Truman begins to have strange experiences that lead him to believe he is being watched. He becomes in-

8. I really don't want to spend time on the quality of food in zoos and the animals' reaction to it. If it proves to be a point of significance, I apologize for not evaluating it further.
9. Jamieson, "Against Zoos." The Animal Ethics Reader, 579.
10. *Whether or not you have seen the movie, you should probably go watch The Truman Show as soon as possible. It's a great movie.*

quisitive after an encounter with his first love at college. Truman flirts with this girl, but she tells him they can't be together. Discouraged, the girl tries to explain that they can't be together because their love story is not part of Truman's plot. Her attempt to unveil Truman's false-nature causes her to be removed from the show. Other events happen, slip ups from the company namely, and Truman realizes he is living in false-nature. His freedom is being restricted to this dome of Seahaven. Worldwide watchers, and you as the movie watcher, cheer for Truman once he escapes this fake world. But why ? The false-nature was as precise as it could have ever been, yet there is something unjust about what the corporation was doing to Truman.

This is analogous to zoos. No matter how perfect humans can craft false-nature, zoos cannot escape the violation of animals' authenticity. Just like Truman, we take these animals either from birth or their natural habitats and raise them in false-nature. The environment may be comfortable or a replica of it, but false-nature violates the normative principle. I do not want to confuse authenticity with naturalness because authenticity has moral principles while naturalness is just a state of affairs. Authenticity requires the personal freedom of an individual. Respect and liberty are arguably two moral principles. Naturalness seems to be more about a state of affairs, which is interesting, but not relevant to my argument. The false-nature of zoos puts animals in an environment where they are unable to have authentic lives, cheapening our aesthetic experience.

IV. Desensitized Responsibility to Nature

Third, by creating false-natures, human status becomes inappropriately bolstered as the relationship with animals devalues, further degrading the aesthetic experience. We have desensitized our sense of responsibility to animals' environment because we believe we have power over nature. This is a potentially problematic byproduct of zoos because this type of aesthetic experience gives humans an immoral sense of dominance over animals. In encouraging people to visit animals in zoos instead of the wild, people become more detached from the animals' needs in the wild. As a result, our care for the animals' natural habitats have decreased. Yet, the animals presumably care about their natural habitats. But we need not be concerned because if humans can control nature, why take care of it? This thought process comes from our experience at zoos.[11] The aesthetic experience at zoos most likely cause us to neglect the responsibility or recognition of our ability to improve the animals' natural homes instead of perfecting false-natures. By shifting our focus to returning animals in the wild and keeping them there, we can have heightened aesthetic experiences.

11. *I am not sure if zoos cause this way of thinking, or if zoos are just a very explicit and overt manifestation of these beliefs generally. Either way, it seems messed up. (A special thanks to Caden for this insight).*

V. Immoral Power Dynamic

Fourth, the degraded aesthetic experience implies animal marginalization because we are not meeting the animals authentically, i.e. on their own terms. Martha Tafalla argues that the aesthetic experience of zoos violate the normative principle: "Zoos aestheticize captivity and normalize the image of wild animals behind bars in artificial enclosures and displayed for our enjoyment."[12] In addition to the artificial enclosures mentioned in the previous section, the captivity contributes to the immoral treatment of animals. These two factors suggest that zoos are emphasizing an inaccurate and immoral power dynamic.

Let's pretend that you are going to the zoo today. The weather is lovely, you love animals, so a trip to the zoo sounds like the perfect activity. You go to the zoo and you stand ten feet away from a grizzly bear. You are in awe, but you feel no sense of alarm. After all, it is in a strong and well-built cage. You are inadvertently feeling power over this grizzly bear because the bear cannot hurt you, thanks to man's manipulation of true-nature into false-nature. This is one aesthetic experience, but it is degraded and you have violated the normative principle.

Two weeks later, you decide to go on a hiking trip in Alaska. How adventurous of you. Upon arriving in Alaska, you begin your four day backpacking trip in this last great frontier. About three hours into your hike, you hear a rustling up ahead. A trained hiker, you stop to see what's going on. You look up and immediately a sharp sensation of panic penetrates your soul because ten feet away from you stands a grizzly bear. You have a sense of awe and respect in this aesthetic experience. Luckily, the grizzly bear walks away and you are not harmed.

The two aesthetic experiences are not drastically different because you are ten feet away from a grizzly bear. One experience, however, had you meeting an animal on its own terms. Tafalla argues that, "The aesthetic qualities of animals are relational. It is necessary to perceive the animal in her natural environment in order to comprehend her... When you remove an animal from her natural environment, you no longer have a complete animal, only a fragment."[13] The animal we see in the zoo is not the same animal in the wild and the power we feel in zoos does not translate to our encounter with animals in the wild.

Not meeting an animal on its own terms changes our relationship to animals. The normative principle, grounded by feminist care theory challenges us to look our relationship with sentient beings.

When we evaluate the relationship between human and animal at a zoo, there is an immoral relationship. According to zoos, the relationship requires captivity for one and amusement for the other. In addition to the required captivity, such a relationship is inappropriate because there are moral principles being violated: non-harm, respect,

12. Tafalla, "The Aesthetic Appreciation of Animals in Zoological Parks", 7.
13. Ibid. 4-5.

liberty, and perhaps others. These violations of moral principles are part of the aesthetic experience at zoos. Between the two subjects involved, the animals and the human, there is one subject in the relationship that is being treated immorally whether directly or indirectly. Therefore, the degraded aesthetic experience at zoos violates the normative principle.

VI. An Objection to Consider

At the beginning of this paper, I attempted to acknowledge the benefits of zoos in light of the aesthetic experience. These benefits matter to urban populations because as they grow, fewer people will be able to meet an animal in their natural habitat. Zoos provide access to a world that some people would otherwise never have been able to experience for themselves. Additionally, this unique experience gives rise to the possibility of igniting a love for animals, as it did for me.

This question of whether removing zoos would be worth the cost of losing any aesthetic experience with animals, regardless of its lack of value and moral violation, is important. We want to have as many people develop sympathy and respect for animals. This could be a utilitarian route, and if so, I'm not confident that the route would succeed for those who are pro-zoo. I would argue that the question of zoo removal is anthropocentric. But even so, if we did take the whole calculation of utility, plausibly utility would be maximized if animals were no longer placed and kept in zoos.

First, when we are concerned about the cost of losing our incomplete and immoral aesthetic experience, we are being anthropocentric. I would even go as far to say we are being speciesist. This anthropocentric concern is speciesist because we are only concerned with humans losing pleasure. But did we ever take the animals' pleasure into account ? Harkening back to the dialogical method, it appears to not be the case because we have the means by which we can communicate with animals to know their pleasures. There is an insightful line from a musical called tick...tick..BOOM where the main character asks, "Cages or wings/Which do you prefer?/Ask the birds." I am confident that in having sufficient communication with a bird, we would find that the bird would prefer flight over cage.

VII. Solutions

I think it is worthwhile to ask how humans can still benefit from an aesthetic experience with animals. I have three solutions, some more satisfying than others. The first solution is to encourage exploration of nature. This solution relies on chance and economic advantage, making this solution the least effective, but it certainly qualifies as an option for some. The second solution is to rely on animal documentaries. These documentaries are arguably as effective as the first solution, and animal documentaries provide a more accessible aesthetic experience. The aesthetic experience may not be as enriching, but it is not immoral. In ad-

dition to animal documentaries being a moral option, it allows humans to witness animals on their own terms.

The third solution is safari parks. If safari parks were prioritized we could get a lot of the benefits of the aesthetic experience at zoos without the costs. Safari parks keep animals in their natural habitats and allow humans to have an up-close experience with animals while maintaining human safety. The difference between this protected environment is that the humans are in a cage instead of the animals, which sends humans a different message about their relationship to animals. The downside of safari parks is that, like the first solution, they are not very accessible to urban populations. For those who cannot afford access to safari parks or live in an environment conducive to a variety of species, I recommend the second solution.

Are any of these solutions effective as aesthetic solutions ? My own personal experience confirms that even the weakest solution, the video, can be a good-enough aesthetic experience. Around the age of eight years old, I watched Planet Earth: a docu-series showcasing various animals in their natural habitats. Each episode enthralled me as I watched these animals live in an authentic manner. The impact was so forceful that I adopted a snowy owl through National Geographic. At the pinnacle of my creative abilities, I gave the snowy owl the unique name Hedwig. I donated money to Hedwig every month for a couple of years. Whether or not this money actually went to Hedwig, I don't know, but it was the best I could do as an eight year old with a desire to help an owl in need. This aesthetic experience may have been slightly cheap, but it led to a moral relationship.

VIII. Conclusion

To conclude, I argue that zoos violate the normative principle—one should generally allow someone to live authentically—thereby degrading the aesthetic experience between person and animal.. By utilizing the dialogical method, we can sufficiently understand that animals do not prefer the false-nature habitats to their natural habitats. In addition to our communication with animals, we shouldbecome aware that the animals we do encounter in the zoo are not living authentically. The animals in the zoo live less authentic lives because they cannot have the freedom to control their own life in the relevant sense. When humans do have a true aesthetic experience, in line with the normative principle, humans recognize and appreciate the value of animals. Such recognition calls us to action. As humans, we can use our power to enhance our relationship with animals in order to have better aesthetic experiences with animals. We can have these experiences by exploring nature, video, and safari parks. These three solutions provide an aesthetic experience that would facilitate a relationship of respect, awe, and love between humans and animals. Even if the animals cannot explicitly communicate in perfect English, French, or German, they communicate sufficiently enough for us to know that they would prefer to live authentically.

Zac Bright is a BYU student studying philosophy and French. He plans to apply and attend graduate school to study philosophy, law, or both. He is also still open to becoming a zookeeper. In addition to loving school, Zac loves to engage in philosophical discourse with his newborn baby, run, and watch an unhealthy amount of television with his wife.

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The Loss of the Native's Point of View within Contemporary Anthropology

By
Mike Fulton

Much of the theory within contemporary anthropology is focused on critical introspection with the aim of improving the discipline. Anthropology has a troubled past of colonialism and racism which has caused this introspection to be necessary. Critical introspection led to many valuable theories and frameworks which have benefited anthropologists in how they view the world and conduct their studies, as well as improved the relations between anthropologists and the cultures they study. However, it seems that a foundational idea of anthropology has been lost along the way. Franz Boas's "The Native's Point of View"has been left by the wayside in much of contemporary anthropology and at times dismissed in favor of internal critiques of the discipline. This paper examines a debate between Veena Das and Joel Robbins surrounding ordinary ethics, the day to day morality of a culture, and arguments for how they may be addressed with the native's point of view. I argue that Anthropology's primary focus should be understanding different cultures and their perspective of the world, not simply on the viewpoints and definitions of anthropologists. If this focus is revived it would serve as a solution to many contemporary debates within the discipline including the debate between Das and Robbins examined in this article.

Introduction

Since the middle of the twentieth century, much of anthropological discourse has been focused on theories and methods within the discipline itself rather than the viewpoints of those being studied. Much of this is due to a recognition of anthropology's troubled past in relation to harmful structures. Many contemporary anthropologists are attempting to reevaluate the discipline to improve it and ensure that anthropology grows and changes as our understanding within anthropology grows. This introspection has yielded many valuable theories and frameworks which have assisted in heightening the anthropologist's ability to conduct research and gain a deeper understanding of their subjects on a theoretical level. However, while examining many of the debates that have taken place within contemporary anthropology, a common trend began to emerge. One of the foundational tenets of anthropology seems to have fallen by the wayside. In his book Argonauts of the Western Pacific, Bronislaw Malinowski describes what he views as the purpose of anthropology: "to grasp the native's point of view, his relation to life, to realize his vision of his world"[1] For Malinowski, this was one of the most important ideas of anthropology and one that an anthropologist should never lose sight of. Whether or not Malinowski himself succeeded in implementing this idea is debatable. Regardless, the idea itself still holds immense value for anthropology. Anthropology is fundamentally about people, and their perspectives are just as important as those of anthropologists, if not more so.

Much of contemporary anthropology has done exactly that. What is more is that many debates within anthropological discourse could be solved if Malinowski's tenent were to be reintroduced to the forefront. The goal of this paper is not to romanticize the anthropology of Malinowski's era, nor to demonize the critical introspection so prevalent in contemporary anthropology; but to demonstrate that it is crucial for anthropologists to keep that original idea of Malinowski in mind within all aspects of their work. I will be critiquing a contemp-orary anthropological debate through this framework The debate surrounding ordinary ethics primarily between Veena Das and Joel Robbins. Others, such as Michael Lambek, have been included to lend further context. Additionally, I will be examining some contemporary discourse, phenomenology in particular, within anthropology that represents how the native's point of view can still be used today without reverting to antiquated ideas.

Debating Ordinary Ethics

Veena Das in her article Engaging the Life of the Other, describes her view on ethics and how they manifest within individuals. For Das, ethics within a culture are simply how individuals engage with the other, while the everyday or the ordinary is where this engagement takes place. Das makes strong arguments for why anthropologists

1. Malinowski, Bronislaw. "Argonauts of the Western Pacific", 19.

should focus on the ordinary essentially because it is the medium where a culture takes place. “What is at stake for me here is both the idea of the everyday and our picture of what is constitutive of moral striving.”[2] She goes on to describe the broadness of everyday life’s semantic meanings, which allow for many potential definitions. "It might, for instance, be thought of as the site of routine and habit, within which strategic contests for culturally approved goods such as honor or prestige take place. For others, everyday life provides the site through which the projects of state power or given scripts of normativity can be resisted.”[3] Everyday life is where culture takes place, in a way it functions as the medium for the events that transpire in a culture, including ethics as described by Das. All of which is what anthropologists are attempting to understand with ethnographic study. Das seems to be approaching everyday life as something that is not a constant. Das’s view of everyday life as something that has been taken for granted but can be vastly differentiated depending on the cultural context.

Beyond just looking at the everyday as something that is varied between every culture, Das also argues that engaging in an ethnographic study. If a full picture of a culture is to be seen, then anthropologists must engage in the everyday rather than just the ceremonies, rituals, and other “special occasion” aspects of a culture. The same is true of the ethics of a culture, you can look at what a culture says about ethics, if they say anything at all. However, it is in the manifestation of these ethics in the everyday milieu of the people in that culture that truly represent that culture’s ethics. Joel Robbins, in Debating Ordinary Ethics, argues that anthropology of ethics, in its focus on the ordinary, tends to marginalize religious contributions to ethics. Robbins makes his argument by saying: “how rituals often both present people with and allow them to perform transcendent versions of values. These encounters, in turn, shape people’s ethical sensibilities, including those they bring to bear in everyday life”[4] Robbins believes that ritual practices and the like, go beyond everyday life while still affecting the ethics of a people. For him, these things are being overlooked by Das’s ordinary ethics. Robbins implies that there are ethical values of the everyday which are being understood by ordinary ethics. But there is an additional level, which he describes as ‘transcendent values’ which exist in context with other values but are based on the religious practices of the culture. This view is valuable in pointing out potential blind spots within ordinary ethics. Robbins discusses the fact that overall; he believes that the shift towards ordinary ethics is a good one, but he is concerned with potential blind spots, religion specifically. When focusing on the everyday it seems that it would be sensible to focus less on the ritual aspects of a culture, such as celebrations that are rare within the culture, not ignoring it entirely but not placing as much importance on it.

2, Das, Veena. “Engaging the Life of the Other: Love and Everyday Life”, 376.
3. Ibid., 376.
4. Robbins, Joel. “What is the Matter with Transcendence? On the Place of Religion in the New Anthropology of Ethics”, 767.

Michael Lambek responds saying: "Robbins argues more generally that the position he calls 'ordinary ethics' ignores, indeed obscures, religion. It could also be criticized for ignoring law, education, politics, and so forth. That is because the project or outlook he calls ordinary ethics was not designed to carve out discrete institutions."[5] Lambek makes an important argument here, Robbins is almost too focused on religion. Lambek further argues that while religion is not at the forefront of the anthropological writings on ethics thus far. It is not being ignored or dismissed, it is just present in a different way than Robbins seems to want. Das responds to Robbins giving an expanded view of her original work:

> or my own work, which shows that even such concepts as God, fundamental to Semitic religions, get mistranslated when applied to Sanskrit texts on sacrifice or to Hindu devotional practices (Das 1983; 2008).

In the case of Sanskrit texts, gods were considered secondary and external to sacrifice (as compared to the offering, which was seen as primary and internal; they were seen as creations of language rather than having any independent existence of their own).[6]In addition to Robbins hyper focus on religion, his use of the term 'transcendence' seems to imply a superiority over other ethics. Das is not ignoring religion in ordinary ethics, rather the potential differing roles it plays in different cultures.

These views are not diametrically opposed, it is simply that one anthropologist seems to have a fixation on religion, and possibly views it as the superior origin of ethics. While the other understands religion as another aspect of the ordinary within a culture. They are not debating the inherent validity of ordinary ethics, rather, simply, what is meant by 'ordinary.' This is a clear manifestation of the trap that arises when focusing on critical introspection within a discipline. A problem which could be solved rather easily. Rather than a large group of academics publishing papers to determine what is to be considered ordinary within a culture that is not their own, the anthropologist should simply ask the members of a culture what is ordinary

Determining what is ordinary within a culture should not be up to the anthropologist. Robbins should not be able to determine that religion is ordinary just as Das and Lambek should not be able to say that religion is not part of the ordinary. Rather, the determination of the ordinary should come directly from the peoples and cultures being studied. Ordinary is entirely objective, as is demonstrated by the completely different perspectives of the theorists described here. Rather than arguing about what is and is not ordinary, we should return to that original idea written by Malinowski and find the native's point of view of what is ordinary. Ordinary ethics should not be dismissed, rather it should be approached in a different way. An anthropologist should take the time

5. Lambek, Michael. "Response to Robbins", 782.
6. Robbins, 787.

in fieldwork to determine what is ordinary to the subjects and then determine how ethics work within that medium. This would allow for the vast number of different perspectives and return anthropology to its foundational tenant. Das seems to understand this but does expand on the argument. We can still study ordinary ethics but to do so we must let the subject tell us what is ordinary. Realizing that it is not up to the anthropologist to decide if religion is ordinary or not, it is up to them to ask if it is. This returns to the original focus on the subject's viewpoint rather than the anthropologist's taking precedent. One potential solution to this, that is already being introduced, is phenomenology.

Phenomenology as a Contemporary Solution

Phenomenology is the study of phenomena as they appear to an individual or a group of people. "How do social relations, modes of perception, or life more generally take form in people's lives? to examine experience from a phenomenological perspective is to recognize the necessary emplacement of modalities of human existence within ever-shifting horizons of temporality."[7] Applying a phenomenological approach to anthropology brings a fresh perspective to the discipline and gives more attention to aspects of culture that may be taken for granted. Phenomenology allows the perspectives of the subject to be brought to the forefront while contemplating the different ways in which they manifest, providing a contemporary framework for Malinowski's ideas.

From a more philosophical perspective, Edmund Husserl describes phenomenology as: "The world of the natural attitude: I and my surrounding world."[8] Husserl's 'natural attitude' approach to phenomenology simply views it as the feelings, observations,judgements, and experiences of individuals in relation to the im-mediate world surrounding them. Husserl views everyone as part of a larger world,which is spread out in space, but as affecting, and being affected by, their immediate vicinity both physically and culturally. Thus, the 'natural attitude' is an individual's outlook on their lifeworld. Conceptually, not far removed from Malinowski's 'native's point of view.' Henry Harris, when speaking of Hegel's phenomenology, gives us further insight into the scientific application of this philosophical school of thought. "One cannot do 'science' without knowing how to be a neutral observer; of course, one makes mistakes and suffers from biases, but one is prepared to have them pointed out and to recognize the justice of the correction,"[9] This idea is a valuable warning for the argument I am making, a pheno-menological approach to anthropology can appear as simply reporting the views of the subjects, but to do so without bias is still

7. Desjarlais, Robert. Throop, C. Jason. "Phenomenological Approaches in Anthropology", 88.
8. Husserl, Edmund. "The Basic Approach of Phenomenology.", 60.
9. Harris, Henry S. Hegel. "Science as Self Comprehension.", 93-94.

impossible. Anthropological study cannot be truly accomplished in a non-biased manner, but a shift towards a phenomenological approach may allow for a clearer representation of a culture's own viewpoints.

Shifting towards phenomenology within anthropology shows a desire and a necessity to reinforce the perspectives of the subjects. A phenomenological approach to anthropology is not a direct one-to-one representation of the native's point of view. There are many different aspects that phenomenology brings allowing it to stand alone as its own theory. Discourse surrounding lifeworlds, as well as a recognition of the limitations of the discipline's ability to truly understand each individual experience are all important aspects of phenomenology. What is key is the focus and the pursuit of phenomenology, a focus on not just the perspective of the subject culture, but the perspective of the individual within that culture. Combine this with the pursuit to understand the perspective of the individual and phenomenology serves as a fantastic representation of Malinowski's foundational tenent within contemporary anthropology.

Conclusion

Critical introspection as the focus of anthropologist's studies has been an ongoing trend within contemporary anthropology. Leading to the general creation of new theories and frameworks that can critique and be applied to studies of different peoples and cultures. Many of these new theories seem to be created purely for the sake of critique, generating new theories, and further critique. Thus creating a cycle that traps the discipline within itself. In many ways, this has benefitted anthropology by assisting academics in the re-evaluation of past structures and potentially problematic aspects of anthropology's history. However, along the way, something has fundamentally changed within anthropology itself. Anthropologists in their studies of other people are more concerned with their own ideas and perspectives on these cultures than they are with the perspectives of their interlocutors. This may not seem like an issue at face value because of the level of expertise that comes from anthropologists, but with the loss of the subject's view their agency can also be lost. Bronislaw Malinowski laid the groundwork for much of what anthropology would become, and his primary goal for anthropologists was to grasp the native's point of view on their own world. How does the subject view their world and their place within it? This idea is meaningful for many reasons, and not the least of which is the level of agency it gives to the subjects of anthropological study. It is a fundamental recognition that anthropological study is not a purely observational science; it is an interaction and a relationship with those being studied. In order for that relationship to be healthy and worthwhile, the perspectives of the individuals being studied needs to be a crucial aspect of the dichotomy.

Within the debates examined here, the fundamental argument surrounds what should and should not be considered ordinary. What is ordinary is not objective or universal in any way, it is completely different based upon the group and the individuals being studied. It is not up to the anthropologist to decide but to discover. The anthropologist has no real right to say that religion is or is not ordinary in any concrete way because it is not their place to decide what is ordinary for a culture. Doing this not only limits the representation of the culture but could be considered an unethical dismissal of the individuals in question. Rather, the anthropologist should focus on the subject's point of view of their world to determine whether religion, or any other cultural aspect, could be considered ordinary in that specific context. Contemporary anthropologists should reevaluate their standards and ensure that they do not forget the point of view of those being studied and that the subject is allowed agency in the world's understanding of them.

Anthropologists should not abandon the critical introspection which has led to so many improvements within the discipline, and none of this is to say that the perspective of the anthropologist should not matter. Rather, the anthropologist should not lose sight of the relationship between themselves and the subject, nor should they lose sight of the foundational principles of anthropology. Theories such as phenomenology demonstrate how the two are not mutually exclusive. Anthropologists have a lot of valuable expertise to dissect and understand other peoples and cultures. But as a discipline it also has one of the greatest advantages any science could ask for, the ability to communicate directly with subjects of study. If the perspective of a subject is available, and can be applied to an area of study to increase understanding, why would that be avoided? Anthropology is fundamentally about people, and their perspectives have just as much value as our own.

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Foot and the Categorical Imperative

By
McKay Hammarstrom

Immanuel Kant's moral theory distinguishes between hypothetical imperatives and categorical ones. Hypothetical imperatives are commands of the will towards some purpose or end. They are instrumental and are binding only so long as one wants the end in question. A concrete example of a hypothetical imperative is wanting a piece of chocolate. One is only commanded by the will so long as the desire remains. Once it is gone, so is the command. On the other hand, categorical imperatives are commands of reason, derived from humanity's autonomos nature. Humans can understand value and generalize actions based on their understanding of what is good. Morality, then, is a function of reason which necessarily commands, and is not a function of desire, which would contingently command. The categorical imperative should therefore supply a reason to act regardless of one's desire to act. Kant's example is of a suicidal man. Only duty, that one should preserve one's life, can overcome his desire to end his own life. The philosopher Philippa Foot criticized Kant's theory by denying any difference between categorical imperatives and hypothetical ones. Morality in her view is a function of desires only. Foot argues that etiquette serves as an example of a hypothetical imperative that commands like a categorical one. It seems as though one is bound to etiquette like any command of morality and since one should follow etiquette, there would not be any special reason-giving force from categorical imperatives distinct from hypothetical imperatives after all. I argue that while Kant's moral theory has problems, Foot's critique does not obtain because etiquette can fail to apply, unlike the categorical imperative. I furthermore argue that Kant's rationalist ethics are at least rationally defensible against Foot's conception of ethics as consisting only of hypothetical imperatives.

Introduction

In Immanuel Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, he argues that morality consists of obeying rational laws given to ourselves by reason. He terms this the categorical imperative and distinguishes it from what he calls hypothetical imperatives. For Kant, the categorical imperative differs from hypothetical ones because of our rational nature. Duty is discovered when we rid ourselves of all our conflicting desires to see what morality really is.[1] Thus, we are then able to act out of respect to duty, out of an understanding of what is actually right, precisely because it is not a passing fancy but a law legislating by our reasoning capacities. If it were just a disposition towards some conduct and not others, then there'd be no reason to respect it or follow the moral "feeling" at all. Morality would be like any other feeling in giving reasons to act and thus have no special ability to command us, which, Kant believes, it clearly does.

Although Kant's theory has had plenty of detractors since its inception, one notable critic was the Oxford philosopher Philipa Foot. She argues that morality is not a product of reason at all. Rather, in Foot's view, morality only consists of hypothetical imperatives. Her criticisms are twofold. First, she rejects Kant's claim that the categorical imperative uniquely commands us. Second, she questions whether it could motivate us even if it did exist. I will argue that Foot is mistaken in both cases. As we shall see, she misunderstands the categorical imperative's relation to reason, as well as how reason can motivate us to action.[2] Whether or not Kant ultimately has the correct normative theory will be immaterial for my argument. I seek instead to demonstrate in the course of this paper that Foot's criticisms of the categorical imperative fail and that Kant's theory is at least rationally defensible.

Hypothetical and Categorical Imperatives

"Now, all imperatives command either hypothetically, or categorically" (Kant 28, italics in original).[3] An imperative is a command of the will. Hypothetical imperatives are means to an end. If I have the desire to play the game *go*, then I should learn how, buy a board, and so on. This should is contingent on my desire to play *go*. If the desire disappears, so does the imperative. By contrast, the categorical imperative is a result of our rationality. Duty is discovered when we rid ourselves of our conflicting desires to see what morality really is.[4] Thus,

1. Immanuel Kant. *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, ed. by Mary J. Gregor & Jens Timmerman. (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 15.
2. Foot, like Hume, did not believe that reason motivates us to act at all. Kant's theory depends on the opposite position.
3. Ibid., 28.
4. Ibid., 15.

we act out of respect to duty, out of an understanding of what is right, because it is not a passing fancy. If it were, then there'd be no reason to respect it or follow the moral "feeling" at all. Morality would be like any other feeling in giving reasons to act.

Why then should we follow duty at all, if we do not already have the desire to in the first place? Kant offers us a few different accounts, but they are all founded on the basis of our rationality. Because we are at least somewhat rational,[5] we act out of an understanding of the sorts of things that we value, judging them by reason, a standard outside of ourselves, as it were, and not from one feeling to the next. Another important aspect of our rationality is the fact that we are free. To be free means to be self-governed (the etymological origin of the word "autonomy"). Wherever there is causation, something must have caused it. One name for the force is a law, like a law of nature. Being free means that we cause ourselves. In humans, that law which we use to govern ourselves is reason, because we are rational. Morality is then something that we give to ourselves as laws to govern ourselves according to reason.

Kant holds that the will is practical reason, or the ability we rational creatures have to generalize actions from laws.[6] Furthermore, the will can pick out what is morally good, independent of our current feelings about it.[7] Actions that are morally good are those done from and out of a good will, the only thing that is good without qualification.[8] Therefore, the will uses reason to determine what is good. The form of the principle used to determine what is good is the categorical imperative, formulated differently in different places, but generally articulated as an imperative to not act unless the intended act can be universalized as a moral law.[9] This is a law we give to ourselves, in accordance to reason. To disregard it is to be unreasonable, because reasoning is what determines the law in the first place by using the categorical imperative. Reason commands absolutely; one can disregard the laws of mathematics, but s/he is no longer engaging in math when s/he says that 2 + 2 = 5. The metaphor of math is particularly useful in illustrating Kant's point in more detail. 2 + 2 necessarily equals four. However, nothing prevents me from writing or wishing that 2 + 2 = 5. While questions about the ontological nature of mathematics are best left to metaphysicians, let us assume that the sole reason we know mathematical truths is by reasoning, something we do internally. So when I write that 2 + 2 = 5, I know that I am doing something wrong, because I have worked through the logical reasoning in Robinson arithmetic to know that this equation cannot work. Nevertheless, I am free to do so without any external punishment from reality itself. But I don't write it or use it, because I know that it is wrong, not

5. Kant does not claim that all humans must be rational all the time in all phases of their lives for his theory to work.
6. Ibid., 26.
7. Ibid., 27.
8. Ibid., 12.
9. Ibid., 34.

by convention, but by reason itself. If mathematical truths were external, in the sense that they were a convention made and agreed upon by other humans (again, leaving questions of mathematical realism aside), then I would not be privately motivated to obey the laws of mathematics as I discovered them. Rather, it has to do with the form that I discovered (or more appropriately, that R. M. Robinson discovered), not the material components of mathematics. By which I mean that whether or not the equation is instantiated in reality, it still holds, just like logic and, according to Kant, just like morality. The categorical imperative allows us to discover the form of morality, which we then apply to the content of life. Its reason-giving force is analogous to math and logic.[10]

Hypothetical commands do not work in this way, because they are based on experience and what we want. If I want to learn Latin, then I should take classes to study the language. But there is no moral force to it, since it is based on a desire. If I no longer want to learn Latin, then there is no reason for me to study it. True, there may be moral principles that underlie it. Perhaps I will get a scholarship to learn Latin so that I can teach it to children who would benefit from it. But then the reason is no longer hypothetical, but rather categorical in that I should keep my promises. The categorical imperative is unique because, by its nature, it guarantees that an action is moral or immoral. And thus, they are "necessary without reference to any purpose," because they are commands of reason and not based on feelings contingent on any number of factors.[11]

Foot's Critique

Foot believes that etiquette demonstrates how the categorical imperative does not work as Kant meant it to. Etiquette should work like a hypothetical imperative: if one has an end, do what it takes to achieve it. But etiquette seems to have more normative force than just fulfilling a want, i.e., etiquette doesn't seem to fit into the category "hypothetical imperative." The command, "You shouldn't put your elbows on the table in a formal dinner setting," does not seem to have any special reason-giving force in the same way morality does, but if the average polite man were asked why he kept his elbows off the table in a formal dinner setting, he'd likely answer along the lines of "Because it's polite." And this response underscores her point, for although etiquette doesn't have what she calls "automatic reason-giving force," we use it as though it does.[12] Let's take a look at Foot's argument in more depth.

1. Only non-moral uses of "should" yield hypothetical imperatives.
2. Only commands of reason and their use of "should" yield categorical imperatives.

10. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 37-38.
11. Ibid., 28.
12. Philippa Foot, "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives," *The Philosophical Review*.

3. Categorical imperatives are reasons in themselves to act by their very form.
4. Commands of etiquette are not moral commands.
5. Commands of etiquette seem to yield imperatives that are non-hypothetical (categorical).
6. Commands of etiquette are not in themselves reasons to act.
7. Commands of etiquette are identical to categorical imperatives by their form.

The categorical imperative gives no more reason to act than a command of etiquette.

Foot asks us how the categorical imperative can motivate us to be moral at all, especially given the etiquette counterexample. She objects to Kant's insistence on the absolute command of morality, because it seems like it is no different from etiquette, at least in form. Morality should be something that commands by its very logical form, while hypothetical imperatives are always contingent on desires. Of course, to say that "morality" does the commanding is a bit misleading, for, as members of the Kingdom of Ends who legislate to ourselves the moral law, reason/we are the ones who command ourselves.[13] Kant assumes that being reasonable is enough motivation to act, and Foot acknowledges a "dignity" to the "should" of the categorical imperative, in part because of its uniqueness as a command of reason, and not a mere desire, in that its unique form and formulation can motivate us to act according to the moral law we discover.[14] Foot's counterexample should then undermine whatever confidence we had in the categorical imperative's unique ability to command ourselves.

Building on the idea that the categorical imperative is not genuinely categorical, Foot's second argument demonstrates how morality really just consists of hypothetical imperatives.[15] It is as follows:

1. Some man is not moral.
2. He has a duty to be moral (i.e., follow the categorical imperative).
3. He does not care to be moral.
4. He ought to want to be moral.
5. (4) is a hypothetical imperative and thus does not contain any special reason-giving force outside of desire.

∴ There is no reason to be moral outside of a hypothetical imperative to be moral.

She ultimately attributes the desire for theories like the categorical imperative to a psychological desire to have control over morality, so

13. Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 46.
14. Foot, "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives", 5.
15. Ibid., 11-12.

that morality does not end up being something contingent on us. Duty plays no part in our desire to be moral, nor does it command us as Kant says it does. The example she gives is of those who fought in Stalingrad, who never feared that their comrades should lose their own sense of morality. That maintaining the city was not a matter of morality, but of avoiding annihilation from either the Nazis on the one hand, or from the Soviet government for failure on the other, does not figure in Foot's brief description, which she instead attributes to the loyalty and devotion of the citizens to the city. Historical quibbles aside, morality for Foot comes down to our desire to be moral in the first place, independently of our reasoning.

With all of this in mind, let us reexamine Foot's argument A. She claims that etiquette is an example of a normative command that is not moral, thus showing that the categorical imperative is not unique, because the reason-giving force of both commands are equal. In the first place, we can easily reinterpret the command of etiquette using the categorical imperative. When we reason whether we ought to follow etiquette, the answer is that we should so as not to offend people, but never at the expense of moral principles. But I suspect that Foot's example goes a little deeper. The problem is not that etiquette may be a part of morality, albeit a relative part subject to change with customs, but that the form of the command of etiquette looks categorical, when according to Kant, it ought not be. Worse still, it seems to give the same reason-giving force as normal categorical imperatives do. However, following etiquette may be a command of reason (it may also not, depending on the piece of etiquette in question), but commands of etiquette themselves cannot be categorical imperatives, because they are not commands of reason but commands of custom. I do not think that Kant would deny that custom is a powerful force in shaping our behavior, but habit is not the same thing as an imperative. Foot is right to say that etiquette does not have reason-giving force on its own. Rather, it is the categorical imperative, as well as hypothetical imperatives, that do the work. For when we break rules of etiquette, we have not done something morally wrong. Normally, the motivations for keeping etiquette are all hypothetical. For example, we do not wish to embarrass ourselves in polite company, we wish to give a good impression of our parents/institution, and so on. And whosoever wills the ends, wills the means.[16] Etiquette is a hypothetical imperative that we follow for any number of reasons, one of which may be the categorical imperative.

This is all well and good for a Kantian analysis of etiquette, but it may distract from what Foot is actually trying to show. She believes that since commands of etiquette cannot "fail to apply," they are an example of a categorical imperative that is not moral,[17] but this simply cannot be the case. A command of reason is like logic. The form is what determines morality, not the substance. Etiquette contains certain commands about

16. Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 30.
17. Foot, "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives," 5.

substance, all of which are dependent on culture, not reason itself. It is categorical in the sense that society demands it of us, but not categorical in that we legislate it to ourselves. Here is where Foot's example falls apart: etiquette can fail to apply. In many East Asian countries, it is a part of etiquette to remove one's shoes when entering buildings. To me, a westerner in the western part of the United States, this command fails to apply. One categorical imperative is that I ought not to lie. This command applies equally to me as it does to anyone in East Asia or elsewhere, just as if it were the law of non-contradiction in logic or addition in math. Specific commands of etiquette, like "'You should answer . . . in the third person" cannot apply to those who do not write in English.[18] Etiquette can fail to apply; the categorical imperative cannot.

Furthermore, the categorical imperative may command us to break etiquette. Perhaps in the next few years, a small city in Alaska will form and one of the rules of etiquette will be to never interfere with a family's domestic affairs. But upon visiting, we notice that a family abuses one of their children. Let's imagine that we have been there long enough to know all of the customs of the town to the point where we have no excuse to break them. Although etiquette would not fail to apply to us, the categorical imperative dictates that we break etiquette and report the family to the CPS. And if we are moral, we do report them to the CPS. In the relevant Kantian sense of the word, etiquette is not categorical. Premise (2) of Foot's first argument, only commands of reason and their use of "should" yield categorical imperatives, is correct and premise (5), commands of etiquette seem to yield imperatives that are non-hypothetical (categorical), is false.

So much for Foot's first argument. The second fails in a similar manner. Let us imagine in this far off town, there is a man named Callicles who does not care to be moral. He has full knowledge of the abuse, but does not feel inclined to put a stop to it. He is also a fully-functioning adult in full possession of his wits. Foot would say that Callicles is not beholden to the categorical imperative as we understand it, and is at the same time not irrational, because he simply does not want to follow it. That is, "irrational actions are those in which a man in some way defeats his own purposes, doing what is calculated to be disadvantageous or to frustrate his ends. Immortality does not necessarily involve any such thing."[19] I think that Kant and Foot simply have different definitions for what constitutes an irrational action. They would agree that it would be a self-defeating one, but Kant would argue that refusing to follow morality likewise constitutes a self-defeating action. As we have seen, Foot's example does not show that Kant's distinction is invalid, and our review of Kant's moral theory has established that morality as a function of reason is rationally defensible. Not to act when morality commands otherwise is to be irrational. And so, Callicles is irrational.

18. Ibid., 7.
19. Ibid., 7.

In order to adequately refute Foot's second argument, however, we need to show how premise (4), he ought to want to be moral, does not hold. Kant gives the example of the suicidal man, who is still motivated to hold onto life because reason commands him to.[20] The example indicates how duty does not depend on our feelings. The real question to answer, then, is not whether Callicles ought to want to be moral, but whether he should be reasonable. This is a decidedly more difficult question. Kant maintains, as have philosophers since its ancient beginnings, that we, normal humans, are reasonable by our
nature. To say that we don't want to be rational is an incoherent statement. Being irrational is simply a state of being. It is not likely that the insane want to be sane, for if they could consider it, then they are already on the path to recovery, because they have enough presence of mind to state a preference for one state over another, an act that requires the use of our wits.

Premise (4), he ought to want to be moral, then fails, because it is not necessary to want to be moral to act morally, but rather just to act out of duty while knowing that the action is from duty. If Callicles does not accept morality as a function of reason, then he is being irrational. Ultimately, I think that Foot requires too much from a rationalist moral theory. If Callicles is neither motivated to be specifically moral, or pretends to not want to be reasonable, then he is a lost cause, as is anyone who spurns either morality or reason. The answer for such people is the same for the abusive family in our small town: we lock them up, or we ensure they follow the law.

Undoubtedly there are still problems with Kant's moral theory. But I don't think Foot identified the underlying issues. I think that anyone, most moral philosophers included, would agree that our understanding of what's good for us does motivate us to act. I furthermore agree with Kant that this understanding is delineated by reason. And I side with Kant against Foot on the wonder that the moral law causes. Something that creates a fair bit of wonder by its ability to command uniquely doesn't seem reducible to mere desire. In other words, the ethical "should" is more than just a special feeling. And so, while Kant's theory may not be the best, Foot does not prove her case.

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20. Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 14.

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How to Be an Object: Deciphering Baudrillard's Phenomenology

By
Jackson Hawkins

Although he is still recognizable as a giant of postmodernism, today Jean Baudrillard's work attracts relatively little attention in departments of philosophy. In this essay, I seek to illuminate some of Baudrillard's more obscure insights by analyzing them through the phenomenological lens established by Edmund Husserl. Focusing on Baudrillard's text, The Object and Its Destiny, I conduct an exegetical reading in order to clarify some of the opaque passages contained therein. The picture that emerges as a consequence of this inquiry is a unique and idiosyncratic philosophical worldview in which objects come to dominate subjects, and phenomenology is turned on its head. With the passing of Baudrillard himself in the early 21st century, my work here represents an important contribution to the ongoing work of analyzing his philosophical project, as well as a foray into one of the most intriguing and neglected texts produced during the brief reign of the postmodern masters.

Introduction

Mark Poster, one of Baudrillard's own editors, said of his writing that "He [Baudrillard] fails to define key terms, such as the code; his style is hyperbolic and declarative, often lacking sustained, systematic analysis when it is appropriate; he totalizes his insights, refusing to qualify or delimit his claims."[1] Indeed, those who have encountered his work will agree that Baudrillard's impenetrability often rivals the most notoriously difficult philosophers. While intellectual tracts from 20th century France are opaque as a rule, following his blacklisting from French intelligentsia in the aftermath of Forget Foucault, Baudrillard was only able to attain any kind of celebrity in the United States. One wonders if his legacy might have been more formidable had he not refused to clarify his work for American audiences (the failure of the American public to fully appreciate Baudrillard's oeuvre is evident from its mangled representation in The Matrix). Partially due to this pariah existence, today Baudrillard is widely considered to fall within that discipline which lies adjacent to philosophy, but does not quite coincide with it: "social theory." Insofar as he is spoken of outside of specialized circles, Baudrillard's insights are frequently treated as beginning and ending with Simulacra and Simulation, and even this book is usually stripped down to its first chapter, The Precession of Simulacra. Granted, the piece is an excellent sample of Baudrillard at his most incisive, but it is not Baudrillard at his most philosophical, and construing it as the culmination of his career is a mistake. The philosophical Baudrillard does exist, and he emerges in the extended essay The Object and Its Destiny (hereafter, TOID). Despite being characteristically riddled with hyperbole and apparent contradictions, even the uninitiated reader will recognize that the treatise contains something about subjects, objects, and their relations to one another. In brief, though this may not have been Baudrillard's intention, the structure of TOID bears similarities to the phenomenological method inaugurated by Husserl, and this essay will attempt to elucidate it in these terms. The most important feature of Husserlian phenomenology, as it relates to Baudrillard's project, is known as the "tripartite" model of experience, whose three parts are subject, object, and intentional relation ("intention" here used in the technical sense of the Latin intentio: being directed outward). According to this paradigm, subjects direct their perception towards external things, which then become objects, and it is the relation between these two poles which often takes center stage in phenomenological analysis. However, when one attends carefully to the text of TOID, striving to penetrate its miasma of style, the picture that emerges is an intriguing and idiosyncratic upside-down phenomenology, in which objects relate to subjects as much as the inverse. Although TOID is an extremely wide-ranging text, only those portions of it relevant to the present analysis will be treated here.

1. Jean Baudrillard, *Selected Writings,* 7.

I: Critique of the Subject

From the outset, TOID presents a provocative thesis: "Only the subject desires; only the object seduces."[2] This declaration will serve as a sort of foundational axiom for Baudrillard's proceeding analysis. But, given the numerous senses of the word "subject" available in contemporary philosophy, what precisely does Baudrillard have in mind when he uses the term? There is no simple answer to this question. For instance, Baudrillard claims that the subject of which he is speaking is "not only the psychological subject, but also the subject of power and knowledge."[3] Later, he appends "the subject of history."[4] in this description. A bevy of possible allusions can be read into these passages: Hegel, Foucault, Nietzsche, Freud... Ultimately, it may be impossible to determine exactly which points in the history of philosophy are invoked in these passages, but it seems clear that Baudrillard is comfortable including a wide array of "subjects" in his assault. The question of which of the many contemporary definitions of subjectivity is on trial in TOID is not a fruitful one, for Baudrillard himself is speaking in his customary abstract, universalized register. However, in the broadest sense, it is best to read Baudrillard's critique as addressed to the subject as a continuity of concepts running through the history of philosophy.

At first glance, one may be tempted to associate the first clause of TOID's opening thesis, only the subject desires, with the "desiring-machines" of Anti-Oedipus, the first installment of the two-part Capitalism and Schizophrenia series authored by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. At this stage of their collaborative period, Deleuze and Guattari were attempting to fundamentally rethink the assumptions of psychoanalysis, a project which involved the elevation of desire to a position of extreme importance. While Baudrillard's admiration for Deleuze is no secret, and there is some overlap between Anti-Oedipus and TOID, if Baudrillard does indeed see himself as working from a Deleuze-Guattarian foundation in TOID, then he has misapprehended the collaborators' own understanding of desiring-machines and desiring-production. Stipulations on the part of Deleuze-Guattari such as those included in the following quote make it more-or-less clear that, on their account, it is expressly not the subject that desires or operates a desiring-machine.

> There is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a process that produces one within the other and couples the machines together. Producing-machines, desiring-machines everywhere... the self and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any meaning whatsoever.[5]

Rather, the syntheses constitutive of desiring-machines take place in a realm prior to any individual subjectivity. To Deleuze-Guattari, what

2. Baudrillard, *Fatal Strategies*, 141.
3. Ibid., 142.
4. Ibid., 141.
5. Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus,* 2.

we call the subject is the effect of desiring-machines, not the other way around. This picture is strictly incompatible with Baudrillard's account, which, as displayed in the guiding thesis of TOID, defines the subject in terms of its ability to desire.

But why does the subject deserve to be targeted so ferociously? Baudrillard lambasts it as "weak, fragile, [and] feminine,"[6] and elaborates that "[It] was beautiful only in its arrogant glory, in its caprice, in its inexhaustible will to power..."[7] The inclusion of the phrase will to power is highly significant, for if one interprets this in the truly Nietzschean sense of self-determination, Baudrillard must be understood as attacking a certain arrogance on the part of the subject in presuming itself to be the origin of the entire world order. While Nietzsche considered the "revaluation of all values," the reconfiguration of the world order on one's own terms, to be a necessity which would be brought about as humanity reckoned with the death of God, Baudrillard appears to be suggesting that the subjectivity spoken of in philosophy has always seen itself as godly in just such a way. A radical thesis, but there is undeniable truth to it. In Kant the subject, by way of the transcendental categories which it imposes, gives birth to the world of phenomena; in Descartes the clear and distinct ideas, the only trustworthy sources of information about reality, are couched within the subject; in Hegel the subject's awakening to itself contributes in a privileged way to the self-discovery of God himself; even Plato (from whom all philosophy is supposed to emanate) relies on a sort of unnamed subjectivity which contemplates and apprehends the Ideas. The history of Western thought does indeed seem to be built upon the lionization of the subject and various attempts to understand the world in its terms. Such subjective ambition, Baudrillard contends, is a gross and presumptuous mistake; in Baudrillard's view the subject is neither strong nor determinative, but has always been weak.

Although Baudrillard will eventually proclaim that "we are objects as much as subjects, and doubtless in a more original way,"[8] he seems to regard the philosophical tradition in general as a prolonged attempt to conceal this fact behind the illusion of a self-sufficient subjectivity. Moreover, throughout his immense corpus, the effects of technology and mass media are never far from the center of Baudrillard's analysis. From his earliest publication, A System of Objects, the advance of technology has been associated with the pervasion of an "objective" order, and TOID is no exception to this trend. Simply put, Baudrillard views automation and mass media as having made politics and history irrelevant in the neo-Marxist sense that nothing changes anymore; the historical dialectic has stalled out. All that remains of society is a "spiraling cadaver,"[9] a self-propelled "objective" system of codes and simulations, within which "subjective" human action is

6. Baudrillard, *Fatal Strategies,* 142.
7. Ibid.,143.
8. Baudrillard, *Fatal Strategies*, 156.
9. Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation*, 149.

rendered ineffectual. It is this grim picture which informs Baudrillard's conclusion that "the position of the subject has become untenable... The only position possible is that of the object. The only strategy possible is that of the object."[10] Technology, in Baudrillard's eyes, has exposed the subject in its frailty and made obvious a defect which was always there. It is no longer possible for the subject to flatter itself into accepting its own godly self-sufficiency, for it has been conquered by the code. This unique postmodern environment has opened space for the triumph of the object, an objectivity liberated from its supposed subordination to the subject.

II: Praise for the Object

Baudrillard lavishes praise upon the object just as viciously as he execrates the subject. Whereas the subject merely pretends to be stable and powerful, the object is authentically so. Indeed, all the virtues which the subject deludedly arrogates to itself, in Baudrillard's view, are actually possessed by the object. "[the object] is not divided with itself—which is the destiny of the subject—and it knows nothing of the mirror phase, where it would come to be caught by its own imaginary."[11] The internal division of the subject seems to represent a central target for Baudrillard's disdain, while the object is mighty specifically because it is free of dissonance. The reference to the "mirror phase," marks a transition in TOID, in which Baudrillard moves from the history of philosophy to a criticism of psychoanalysis. In the theory of French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, the mirror phase denotes the stage of human development wherein an infant first comes to identify with its own "reflection," i.e., the image of itself as an individual being. According to Lacan this phase perpetrates the first internal division on the road to ego-formation, as the child's image is something separate from its unified existence as a bundle of immediate sense perceptions, and yet both are somehow "him".

> It suffices to understand the mirror stage in this context as an identification, in the full sense [psycho]analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image.[12]

The decision to invoke Lacan may at first glance be perplexing to those familiar with his work, since he famously asserted that the ego is an object, not a divided subject. But, in Lacan's own terminology, Baudrillard's citation does not pertain to the symbolic order of language, but the imaginary order of perception. To Lacan an infant becomes a subject through identification with his image, while the ego is a linguistic construction to which one relates as though it were an object. Baudrillard's appeal to the mirror phase is directed at the former process, but ultimately it is

10. Baudrillard, *Fatal Strategies,* 143.
11. Ibid., 144 (emphasis added).
12. Lacan, *Ecrits*, 76.

simply a way of emphasizing the fracturing inseparable from subjectivity. If this line of thought is taken at face value, Baudrillard's argument here may be read as a critique of the poststructuralist tendency to place the spotlight on points of rupture and disunity within the subject. For although Baudrillard accepts the "fractured subject" paradigm, he is invested in finding an alternative "strategy" which will negate the enfeebled subject's preeminence altogether. This, he hopes, is to be achieved through the object.

At a later point in TOID, Baudrillard takes up the tragedy of Oedipus in an attempt to demonstrate how the subject must silence the object in order to secure its own false supremacy.

> For Oedipus to return to Thebes... the Sphinx has to be dead, which means an end has to be put to seduction and its vertigo, to the enigma and secret, in favor of a hidden history whose drama lies entirely in repression and whose key is in interpretation.[13]

This is a bicameral reference, invoking both the original tragedy and the appropriation of it which is central to psychoanalysis. It certainly seems as though Baudrillard harbors his own understanding of the historical Oedipus narrative, but he is more interested in pillorying psychoanalysis as the quintessential subject-centric discipline, taking the Sphinx to be symbolic of the objective order. "Similarly, for Freud to enter upon the royal and Oedipal road of psychoanalytic interpretation... he too had to put an end to seduction, had to kill the enigmatic beast, the Sphinx of appearances."[14] Hence, the sins of psychoanalysis are twofold. Firstly, according to Baudrillard psychoanalysis as a discipline rests on transparency: the susceptibility of the patient to the analyst's interrogation, the possibility of exposing repressed truths. But, since it has no desire and is not internally divided, the object is opaque and has no hidden interior to speak of. Indeed, as will be discussed below, this is the key to its seductiveness. And yet psychoanalysis, in its insistence that only the transparent be spoken of, by its very nature does violence to the object. Secondly, the practice tends to reduce all phenomena to a subjective origin, specifically the economy of desire. Baudrillard does not elaborate on this, but he seems to be broadly displeased with the perceived custom within psychoanalysis of devising accounts of world events that prioritize the subject's interior workings. On the whole, it is unclear whether Baudrillard views psychoanalysis as exceptionally offensive to the object, or as simply an exemplary piece of a larger intellectual trend, although given his earlier criticisms of Western philosophy the latter seems more likely. Although, in Baudrillard's view, psychoanalysis could at least be said to bear the virtue of recognizing the subject as divided, rather than arrogantly disregarding this fact as much of Western philosophy is guilty of doing.

13. Baudrillard, *Fatal Strategies*, 174.
14. Ibid., 175.

Whatever the case with psychoanalysis may be, ultimately Baudrillard's understanding of the object is, ironically, crystallized most succinctly at the beginning of his analysis, rather than the end: only the object seduces. In fact, all other characterizations of the object seem secondary to this process of seduction which, in Baudrillard's eyes, is the fundamental relation of objective strategies.

III: Seduction, an Intentional Relation

Objects are static, but they need not be inanimate; Baudrillard's phenomenology is as much about becoming objective as anything else. But why do objects alone seduce? A Sartrean aphorism cited by Baudrillard serves to elucidate the issue:

> In seduction I am not at all trying to expose my subjectivity to the other. To seduce is to assume entirely, and as a risk to be run, by object-ness for the other... I refuse to leave the terrain of my object-ness: it is on this ground that I wish to engage the struggle by making myself into a fascinating object.[15]

In this quotation, one catches a glimpse of at least one sense of what Baudrillard means by "objective strategy": one must assume the role of the object in order to be seductive. For his part, Sartre has a great deal more to say on the matter, for the experience of being an object in the eyes of the Other is a major theme of Being and Nothingness.
He states,

> Merely by appearing the Other allows me to pass judgment on myself as I might pass judgment on an object, for it is as an object that I appear to the Other... Thus the Other has not only shown me what I was; he has constituted me in a new type of being, obliging me to support new qualifications"[16]

In essence, Sartre asserts that whilst being looked upon by another person, I understand that his intention is resting upon me just as mine rests upon other objects; I thus occupy the position of an object in the gaze of the other. For Sartre, this conversion to objectivity is never a complete transformation: "There is no question of any comparison between what I am for myself and what I am for the Other—as if I could find within myself... an equivalent of what I am for the Other."[17] In other words, there is a real difference between the objectivity of a rock, and my objectivity in the eyes of the other, for I am still aware of a subjective element within myself. Likewise, "the Other is only a qualified object for me to the extent that I can be that for him."[18] So, in Sartre's view, becoming an object is only ever partial, never totalized to the status of an

15. Baudrillard, *Fatal Strategies,* 151.
16. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness,* 308.
17. Ibid., 308.
18. Ibid., 400.

inanimate piece of nature. Deviating from this perspective, Baudrillard wishes to make objectivity a goal and endpoint unto itself. This amounts to a radical inversion of the traditional phenomenological paradigm. In such a circumstance, the thing positioned as the object projects its intentionality upon a counterpart which is positioned as a subject. This intentional relation, which flows "backwards" from object to subject, is what Baudrillard terms seduction

What, then, is the role of desire in this picture? Exegetically, this is a difficult quandary to resolve. In nearly the same breath, Baudrillard claims that "only the subject desires,"[19] but also that, "desire does not exist."[20] But if the subject desires, in what sense can desire coherently be said not to exist? In short, Baudrillard is using the word "desire" in two distinct senses. When a subject desires, according to Baudrillard, it is a desire directed towards a seductive object which draws it in. In other words, desire is the subject's response to finding itself caught in the seductive gaze of an object. It is for this reason that Baudrillard refers to desire as a weakness, since in a way, the desiring subject is enslaved to the object of its desire; it must strain and exert itself in order to obtain satisfaction. Conversely, the object is powerful in its "indifference," its lack of desire. It is self-sufficient and needs no gratification. In a different sense, when Baudrillard asserts that "desire does not exist," he seems to be saying something akin to "the desire which makes the subject a slave is not something worth pursuing." This is illustrated by the fact that the claim of desire's non-existence is followed by the caveat: "The only desire is to be the destiny of the other, to become for him the event that exceeds all subjectivity... in a passion that is—finally, definitively —objective."[21] Thus, there are two desires: the weakening desire of a subject for an object, and the empowering desire to become an object.

Being truly objective would thus require that one abandon all desire and affect an air of pure indifference. According to Baudrillard, this would make one both seductive and impervious to seduction, powerful in the ability to demand the desire of others, and free from the tyranny of one's own desire.

Why be an Object?

This inverted phenomenology of the object is an undeniably bizarre picture, and it is natural to wonder what exactly Baudrillard wishes to do with it. As mentioned briefly above, the strategy of the object is meant to be more suited to the technological age than its specious subjective counterpart. But there is another side to Baudrillard's motivation. Published two years prior to Fatal Strategies, Baudrillard's most famous work contains what may be a prefigurement of his analysis in TOID: "To the demand of being a subject [one] opposes... an object's

19. Baudrillard, *Fatal Strategies*, 141.
20. Ibid., 144.
21. Ibid., 144.

resistance."[22] Baudrillard proceeds to argue that, paradoxically, freedom has become compulsory in the postmodern era. In other words, the strategy of the subject has come to be universally valued and applauded in a West where liberal democracy is ubiquitous. According to Baudrillard, the only way of effectively resisting such a system is to refuse to be free, to make oneself an object.

Even by the standards of late 20th century French intelligentsia, Baudrillard is often regarded as radical to the point of unapproachability, and the analysis contained in TOID is no exception. Between his universalized descriptions of a world tyrannized by technology and his questionable appropriation of Sartrean phenomenology, one is tempted to wonder whether there is anything of value at all in his so-called objective strategies. Ultimately, this question falls to the reader. But even if Baudrillard's theories are entirely blunderous, the fact that he dared to push his theories to such abnormal limits ought to attract the attention of intellectual historians and unorthodox students of philosophy alike. Indeed, as Dominic Pettman notes in the introduction to the 2008 edition of Fatal Strategies, "Rescuing Baudrillard's ideas from caricature becomes a challenging and important task, now that he is no longer with us." To the extent that this essay has contributed to this ongoing project, it has succeeded in its goal.

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22. Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation*, 85.

Untitled (2022)

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Siddhartha Gautama: A Secular Suspension of the Ethical

By
Hayden Berg

In his book Fear & Trembling, Soren Kierkegaard recounts the attempted murder of Isaac by his father, the Biblical prophet Abraham. Throughout the work, Kierkegaard attempts to justify Abraham's actions by understanding them as being an act of faith. According to Kierkegaard, Abraham's placement of his own will over his ethical obligation to his son is an act that must either be condemned as immoral or justified in some way. Any transgression of the universal ethical is an act of evil unless otherwise justified. Faith is the only justification that allows Abraham to take the specific actions he does while escaping moral culpability. Employing a methodology similar to Kierkegaard's, I analyze the biographical details of Siddhartha Gautama, the 'enlightened one' or Buddha of the Buddhist tradition. I pay special attention to the story of Siddhartha's renunciation of the world, which involves him leaving behind his wife and child in pursuit of enlightenment. After establishing that Siddhartha's transgression of the ethical is similar to Abraham's, I explore the possibility of a secular suspension of the ethical, devoid of any kind of faith-based justification. The establishment of this secular suspension of the ethical either causes problems for Kierkegaard's faith-based justification of Abraham's actions or suggests that Siddhartha Gautama may be an immoral actor.

In Søren Kierkegaard's book Fear and Trembling, his pseudonymous character Johannes de Silentio explores the ethical implications of the Biblical story of Abraham and Isaac. Silentio's concerns are laid out in the book as three problemata which he addresses one by one. This essay will focus on the first problema, which attempts to answer the question of whether or not a teleological suspension of the ethical is possible. Following Hegel, Silentio explains the nature[1] of the ethical as being a universal and ultimate "τέλος for everything outside itself."[2] It is a law or standard of sorts which applies to all people at all times and determines the rightness or wrongness of a given moral action. The relationship of the individual to that universal is, then, necessarily one of subservience. To use one's individual will to transgress one's universal ethical duty would amount to a kind of evil or immorality. Inversely, for one to dedicate the use of their individual will toward meeting the universal ethical would be a righteous and praiseworthy path. Ergo, the individual has their τέλος in the universal ethical[3],while the universal ethical has its τέλος only in itself. For Silentio, the story of Abraham represents a complete subversion of this system. Abraham, asserting his individual will, goes entirely against his ethical duty to his son and is wholly prepared to sacrifice him without any higher ethical duty as his cause. The fear and trembling Kierkegaard, through Silentio, suggests we all ought to feel comes from this realization that Abraham, a central figure of most Western Religion, is no more than a deranged murderer. Silentio's solution to this problema is to conclude that faith represents a paradoxical justification wherein "the single individual is higher than the universal." In short, Abraham's actions are not unethical because they represent an act of religious faith, as defined by Silentio[4]. Abraham's faith allows him to suspend his ethical duties, transgress the universal ethical, and posit his individual will above the universal while escaping the designation of evildoer or immoral man.

This raises the question of whether or not it would be possible to have a secular suspension of the ethical. Abraham's actions were absolved of all wrongdoing because of his religious faith. Would it be possible for an individual, without any religious faith backing their decisions, to elevate their own will above that of the universal while still being venerated and loved to the same degree as Abraham? I argue here that the life of Siddhartha Gautama, the "enlightened one" (or Buddha) of Buddhist philosophy, represents just such a secular suspension of the ethical. Siddhartha's journey to enlightenment begins with deserting his wife and child for no higher purpose than his own desired end, his action had nothing to do with faith in a deity or higher power, and he is, to this day, treated with love and veneration comparable to Abraham.

1. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*.
2. Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling/Repetition*, 54.
3. See Hegel's *Elements of the Philosophy of Right,* §139.
4. Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling,* 55.

The Teleological Suspension of the Ethical

Silentio writes, "the story about Abraham is remarkable in that it is always glorious no matter how poorly it is understood."[5] This expresses Silentio's concern that nearly everyone who belongs to a Judeo-Christian religion regards the story of Abraham as "glorious" without much thought as to the actual content and actions which take place in it. To illustrate this point, Silentio spins a hypothetical tale of a man who, desiring to be like Abraham, attempts to kill his own son after hearing Abraham's story in church. The preacher, upon finding out about this man's plan, would likely claim that he was possessed or overcome by evil for doing something like this. However, the man, according to Silentio, would have every right to reply, "[b]ut, after all, that was what you yourself preached about on Sunday"[6]. This is the essence of what troubles Silentio regarding the story of Abraham: most are willing to blindly accept Abraham's story as it stands without questioning. They allow themselves to "recite the whole story in clichés"[7] and pay no mind to the horrific nature of what takes place. Silentio's plea to his readers throughout Fear & Trembling is that we don't allow ourselves to "stretch out [our] legs comfortably," but rather, that we tarry with these issues and either understand Abraham as a man of faith or accept him as a murderer.

This tale about the would-be murder leads Silentio to a discussion about the first problema which will be the focus of this paper. The first problema is presented, like the other two, in the form of a question, "Is there a Teleological Suspension of the Ethical?"[8] Silentio addresses this question by introducing the concept of the ethical as the universal. He claims that the ethical is the ultimate τέλος which applies, universally, to all people, at all times. The single individual is one who has their τέλος in the universal and is subservient to the universal ethical. Sin can, therefore, be defined as a case where the single individual asserts their own will above that of the universal ethical. Similarly, repentance can be seen as the process of the single individual reverting back to the universal ethical. Given these definitions, what could Abraham be but a sinner to the most despicable degree? After all, Silentio clearly explains that "in ethical terms, Abraham's relation to Isaac is quite simply this: the father shall love the son more than himself." If this is the case, how do those who uphold Abraham as a holy man come to terms[9] with the fact that he explicitly suspends that duty in his act of attempted murder? In an effort to escape this problem, Silentio makes the claim that, "Faith is namely this paradox, that the single individual is higher than the universal."[10] Faith comes in for Silentio as a deus ex machina allowing

5. Ibid., 28.
6. Ibid., 29.
7. Ibid., 28.
8. Ibid., 54.
9. Ibid., 57.
10. Ibid., 55.

him to continue to venerate Abraham as the Judeo-Christian icon he represents for so many.

Exploring other examples of ethical violations in history and literature, Silentio sets Abraham apart as unique. Specifically, figures like Agamemnon and Jephthah who sacrificed their children in somewhat similar situations are compared with Abraham. While these stories all represent suspensions of the ethical responsibility of the parent to the child, there is a key difference in Abraham's story that can't be seen in the others. Agamemnon sacrificed his daughter, but he did it to help the Greek army sail to Troy and win a war. Jephthah sacrificed his daughter, but he did it to fulfill a promise he made to God in exchange for the preservation of his people. Both of these figures suspended their specific ethical duty, but neither of them fully suspended the ultimate ethical law. These tragic heroes, "allow an expression of the ethical to have its τέλος in a higher expression of the ethical".[11] Their stories are tragic, but their choices are ultimately utilitarian. They chose one ethical duty, the preservation of their people, over another, their ethical duty to their children. Abraham, on the other hand, is willing to sacrifice Isaac for no higher τέλος than his own. In fact, Silentio makes it clear that Abraham's action is entirely against the ethical in every sense considering Isaac's role as the future of Israel. Silentio writes, "Insofar as the universal was present, it was...in Isaac's loins, and must cry out with Isaac's mouth: Do not do this, you are destroying everything."[12] Abraham's attempt at sacrificing Isaac was representative of the destruction of the future of Israel and was, in every conceivable way, unethical. Abraham does it "for God's sake and—the two are wholly identical—for his own sake."[13] This is Abraham's ultimate transgression and the only means by which we can consider him as anything but a murderer is to accept that he is, instead, genuinely acting on faith.

Siddhartha: The Life of the Buddha

To assuage some of the fear and trembling inspired in us by the story of Abraham, Silentio answers the first problemata by asserting that there can be a teleological suspension of the ethical for him. Specifically, because of Abraham's status as a "faithful man," he escapes any kind of ethical culpability for his action and can still be preserved as a moral paragon. To begin exploring the possibility of justifying a secular suspension of the ethical, I'll give an account of the life of Siddhartha. An understanding of Siddhartha's early life and path to enlightenment will provide necessary context for potentially interpreting his actions as a secular suspension of the ethical. While the biographical details of a religious figure like Siddhartha are often obscured by various historical accounts, myths, and folklore, it's generally accepted that Siddhartha was a historical figure who lived as a prince in modern day Nepal. When

11. Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 59.
12. Ibid., 59.
13. Ibid., 59.

Siddhartha was born, his father, King Suddhodana, brought several Brahmin priests to the palace, as per the custom at the time, to help name Siddhartha and look into his future. One account of this naming ceremony claims that the Brahmins "raised two fingers and gave a double interpretation, saying that [Siddhartha] would either become a Universal Monarch or a Buddha."[14] Others claim that the Brahmin identified that Siddhartha was endowed with thirty-two different marks that make a "great man." The Brahmin then reported that all who carry the thirty-two marks have two paths open before them. They said that if Siddhartha, "live[d] the household life, he [would] become a ruler... but if he [went] forth from the household life into homelessness, then he [would] become an Arahant, a fully-enlightened Buddha."[15] This mark determined much about how Siddhartha's life progressed after this point.

Siddhartha's mother, Maya, died shortly after this naming ceremony leaving Suddhodana in charge of raising Siddhartha with the help of Maha, Siddhartha's aunt. Suddhodana quickly became obsessed with pushing his son toward royalty and away from the life of a Buddha. He did this by giving Siddhartha an idyllic "household life" full of any pleasures he desired. Stories from Buddhist texts tell of Suddhodana having three palaces built for Siddhartha for every season (winter, summer, and the rainy season) and several garden areas as well. Siddartha discusses his upbringing in the Anguttara Nikaya, claiming that he was "extremely delicately nurtured,"[16] having three lotus ponds, each in their own color and only the best sandalwood and garments. In addition to these extravagances, Suddhodana went to great lengths to prevent Siddhartha from coming into contact with any evidence of human suffering.[17] Workers in the palace were dismissed when they became old and frail so they wouldn't come into contact with the prince, workers who remained were forbidden from sharing any knowledge with him about things outside of the palace involving suffering, and a towering wall was built around the perimeter of the king's land to prevent Siddhartha from seeing what went on outside of it. At sixteen, Siddhartha also got married to a woman named Yasodhara[18]. Some sources suggest that their arranged marriage may have been yet another plot by Suddhodana to keep Siddhartha content and satisfied within the walls of the kingdom.[19]

Years after his marriage, though still a young man, Siddhartha desired to leave the palace and see the world beyond the walls of his father's castle. Suddhodana agreed to let him go outside of the walls, but he orchestrated the entire outing to ensure that he would find no evidence of suffering in his travels. Even so, during this journey

14. Venerable Narada Maha Thera, *A Manual of Buddhism,* 2.
15. "Mahâpadāna Sutta: The Great Discourse on the Lineage", 206.
16. Thera, *Manual of Buddhism*, 3; Bhikku Silacara, *A Young People's Life of the Buddha* 7-8.
17. *The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha,* 239-24.
18. Silacara, *A Young People's Life*, 10-11.
19. Ibid., 10-11.

Siddhartha experienced an event known in Buddhist belief as the Four Sights. As he traveled, he encountered an old man, a sick man, a corpse, and an ascetic outside of the castle and these sights affected him deeply. Each representing a different facet of human suffering and frailty, these four individuals inspired a deep existential dread in Siddhartha who was finally coming to terms with the reality that human life is rooted in suffering.[20] Returning to the castle after coming face to face with this reality for the first time, Siddhartha was distraught.

Upon his return to the palace, Siddhartha was met by a messenger who told him that Yasodhara had given birth to their child. Most sources agree that, for Siddhartha, this moment is characterized by a completely apathetic attitude suggesting that, "the Prince showed no signs of gladness at the tidings." According to one telling, Siddhartha said, "A Rāhula has been born to me, a fetter has been born to me"[21] upon hearing the news. The name Rāhula is likely a reference to a demon called Rāhu who was said to obstruct the moon and sun, causing eclipses.[22] Evidence of transgression against the ethical is already evident here in Siddhartha's mistreatment of his newborn child. Before even meeting his child, he named him after a demon, a fetter, "an obstruction in his search for truth."[23] If Silentio is correct in claiming that fathers have a universal ethical obligation to "love the son more than [themselves]"[24] then Siddhartha is clearly transgressing against his obligation in the very act of naming his child Rahula.[25] While this transgression against the ethical is egregious, it is only a preliminary indiscretion which precedes Siddhartha's ultimate transgression that would soon follow. It is said that Siddhartha, "on hearing the news of Rāhula's birth…immediately decided to renounce the world and go forth into homelessness."[26] Distraught by his experience of the Four Sights and feeling a pull toward an ascetic life coming from no higher authority than his own, Siddhartha abandoned his wife and newborn child. When all in the castle were asleep, Siddhartha escaped without saying a word to anyone. This moment is the beginning of Siddhartha's renunciation of the world. Rejecting his life and all he came from and abandoning his family, he escapes into the night to become an ascetic monk and pursue enlightenment. Many texts in the Buddhist tradition discuss the aftermath of Siddhartha's departure as being full of distress and deep sadness. Karen Armstrong writes, in her biography of the Buddha that, "it was a romantic decision, but it caused great pain to the people he loved." This "great pain"[27] Armstrong refers to comes through clearly in older texts which explore the events that occurred after Siddhartha's renunciation and flight. For example, Buddhist philosopher Asvaghosa's

20."Mahâpadāna Sutta", 207-213.
21. Silacara, *A Young People's Life*, 17.
22. Ibid., 17.
23. Robert E. Buswell, Jr., Encyclopedia of Buddhism, 2nd ed., 711.
24. Buswell, *Encyclopedia of Buddhism*, 711.
25. Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 57.
26. Buswell, *Encyclopedia of Buddhism*, 711.
27. Karen Armstrong, *Buddha*, 2.

epic poem Buddhacarita portrays Yasodhara as completely distraught after realizing that Siddhartha had left. Yasodhara cries, "gentle as his beauty seems, it is pitilessly cruel, — who can desert of his own accord such an infant son with his inarticulate talk, one who would charm even an enemy."[28] This is one example amongst pages of Yasodhara's cries of despair upon the departure of Siddhartha from the palace. Evidently, Siddhartha's transgression of the ethical, in his decision to abandon his family, resulted in tremendous amounts of pain and suffering to those who he has ethical obligations toward—specifically, his spouse and child.

The Secular Suspension of the Ethical

Siddhartha's renunciation of the world and abandonment of his wife and child represents a suspension of the ethical with no τέλος beyond Siddhartha's own desires. Siddhartha's transgression is remarkably similar to Abraham's in that all arguments made for Abraham could apply to Siddhartha's case as well. For example, if we borrow a strategy from Silentio, we can imagine a hypothetical copycat case occurring in the present day. Were someone to, upon hearing the story of the Buddha's renunciation, abandon their family in search of a higher sense of enlightenment, we would likely consider that person to be abandoning their ethical duty and acting immorally. However, if someone were to criticize this individual for being immoral, they could cite the fact that Siddhartha's path to enlightenment and Buddhahood has its root in his decision to abandon his family. Just like with Abraham, his followers know this story of transgression, but still hold up the individual as a model for all that is good. If Siddhartha does it and we accept him as being amongst the religio-philosophical icons of our time, worthy of our worship and praise, we have no right to discourage the same action amongst others. We're left in another state of fear and trembling, a place where we're forced to accept that the Buddha's path to enlightenment is built upon an irredeemable transgression.

Similar to the case of Abraham, Siddhartha's actions represent an assertion of the individual desire over the universal ethical τέλος. This transgression of Siddhartha's ethical duty to his family, and particularly to his son, is parallel to Abraham's in every way but one. Siddhartha's motivation to assert his will above the universal τέλος doesn't come from God, deity, or element of faith. In this sense, Siddhartha's suspension of the ethical, his transgression of the universal, is purely secular. Where Abraham asserted his own will for God's sake and his own sake, Siddhartha posited his will above the universal ethical for his own reasons alone. His choice was a means to his own end and nothing more. There is no religion nor faith to render Siddhartha blameless.

Furthermore, Siddhartha doesn't appear to represent a tragic hero considering that his suspension of the ethical is more than a suspension of a single ethical duty. It would more adequately be described as a suspension of the ultimate ethical law in every sense. No utilitarian

28. Ashvaghosha, B*uddhacarita, or The Life of the Buddha*, 106.

reasoning inspired Siddhartha's choice to violate his ethical duty. Where Agamemnon and Jephthah had higher ethical causes to explain their suspensions of their specific ethical duty to their daughters, Siddhartha serves no higher ethical duty in his flight and renunciation. His motive is purely rooted in his own desire for life outside of the kingdom he's been raised in.

Siddhartha's flight and renunciation of the world, as well as his abandonment of his family, represents a secular suspension of the ethical. Kierkegaard's solution to other suspensions of the ethical is found in his proposition of faith as justification. However, given Siddhartha's lack of explicit religious influence in his suspension of the ethical, his is clearly a secular act, entirely devoid of faith. While Siddhartha's case is a quintessential representation of a secular suspension of the ethical with no faith-based justification, he's still considered to be a widely revered religious and philosophical figure. If we consider the Buddha and Abraham to be remotely similar in their roles as central figures in eastern and western religions, respectively, this puts into question Silentio's solution to the first problema. This case of Siddhartha is problematic for Silentio's view because he represents an example of a suspension of the ethical, in the same vein as Abraham, without any type of faith or deity to justify his actions. Specifically, this case causes problems for a faith-based justification of the suspension of the ethical and suggests that there must be some other justification for a secular suspension of the ethical. We must understand Siddhartha's actions without using faith as a justification or accept that the "enlightened one" of Buddhist religion and philosophy violated the universal ethical for no better reason than his own desire to do so. If we accept Siddhartha's actions in spite of his lack of faithfulness, this causes problems for the faith-based justification of Abraham as well.

Hayden Berg is a graduate from the UVU Philosophy department. He plans to apply to graduate programs in philosophy to continue learning about ideas and sharing them with students and friends. His other passions include watching films, reading sci-fi, cooking food, and rooting for Liverpool FC.

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Mysteries and Opposition

By
Greene Rollins

In this paper I address the nature of Heraclitean Flux and explore whether or not Flux is a component of Eleusinian, Orphic, and the Pythagorean Mystery Cult afterlives. I ultimately argue that there is a lack of Flux in the Mystery Cult afterlives and this is why Heraclitus does not like the Mystery Cults. I support my argument by defining Heraclitus' Flux as: that which explains how the elements interact, moving from fire, to water, to earth and back again in a cycle. I then demonstrate that Heraclitean Flux also includes things which we could assume to be non-material. I show this by analyzing the fragments where Heraclitus compares the soul to the element of fire. Noting the relationship of the soul with Fire, I begin to demonstrate how Heraclitus' Flux works within a mythological framework: he uses particular gods like the Furies, who are earth goddesses, and Thanatos and Hypnos to show that places like the underworld are not unmoving and stationary, but are actually filled with the same kind of motion he argues for in his Flux. Once I define and give examples of Heraclitean Flux, I explore the Mystery Cults and their visions of an afterlife. All three of the Cults I explore have either a perpetual or stable afterlife where souls live in eternal bliss, are reincarnated, or are a mixture of the two. I conclude by reiterating my argument that the stability demonstrated in all types of Mystery Cult afterlives contradicts the notion of Heraclitean Flux and that this contradiction against Flux is precisely why Heraclitus has a problem with the Mystery Cults.

"[...] the same thing in us are living and dead,
waking and sleeping, young and old [...]"

Heraclitus' world philosophy is focused primarily on his great cycle—one of flux and unity of opposites, a world held in equilibrium through the transmutation of matter from the state of fire to water to earth and all the way back up again. Although he emphasizes the material mechanics of this cycle, he doesn't break completely with a mythological worldview, acknowledging a soul as well as incorporating several chthonic gods; the brothers Thanatos and Hypnos (death and sleep), as well as major gods like Hades and Dionysos, two gods who he claims are the same.[1] Others from his time, however, present alternate models for the world. Heraclitus attacks several prominent Greek institutions and figures, including Hesiod and Homer but most viciously the Mystery Cults; the Orphics, The Eleusinian Mysteries, the Pythagoreans and Pythagoras himself, who he directly calls an "information gathering fraud."[2] The attacks levied against these three major proponents of the unspoken rituals known as the Mysteries are all a part of a greater war between stability and flux. Each Mystery Cult, whether Orphic, Eleusinian or Pythagorean, presents a kind of infinite stability in their afterlives, which lies in direct opposition to Heraclitean Flux. In this paper I argue that there is an abrasive friction between Heraclitus and the These Mysteries which is rooted in how each deals with concepts of the afterlife, reincarnation, and Heraclitean Flux. To demonstrate this tension, I first explain Heraclitean Flux. Next I focus on Heraclitus' incorporation of that Chthonic deities, namely The Furies, Thanatos, Hypnos, and Dionysos-Zagreus, into his Heraclitan Flux and elaborate how they relate to Mystery Cults. Finally, I elaborate on the Mystery cults themselves and how each of them posits a stable, perpetual, or unchanging afterlife. I end with an explanation that such stability contradicts Heraclitus' theory of flux.

Immortal Mortals, Mortal Immortals

Heraclitus, since the time of Alexander the Great, has been titled "riddling Heraclitus."[3] What perhaps makes him enigmatic and difficult are the qualities of his writing: aphoristic, brief and pithy; "A Road up and down is one and the same,"[4] "The beginning and end on a circle are

1 "For if it were not to Dionysos that they were a procession and sang a hymn to the genitals, they would act most disgracefully. But Hades and Dionysos, for whom they madly celebrate the bacchic rites, are the same." Graham, Daniel W., *The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy: The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocratics* 2011, 179, B15.
2 ibid, 147, B129.
3 τοῖς δ᾽ ἔνι κοκκυστής, ὀχλολοίδορος Ἡράκλειτος, αἰνικτὴς ἀνόρουσε "In their midst uprose shrill, cuckoo-like, a mob-reviler, riddling Heraclitus." Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, trans. Robert Drew Hicks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), Θ α. ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΤΟΣ.
4 Graham, 157, B60.

common,"[5] and "All things are in exchange for fire and fire for all things, as goods for gold and gold for goods."[6] These passages are excellent examples of this obscurity when read singularly, however, each passage is necessary for a greater understanding of his work. The circuit of the circle, the singularity of the road up and down, and the 'exchange' of fire all demonstrate a kind of perspectival flux, beginning, end, up, down, and possession from one person to another. Heraclitean Flux is explored materially in fragment B36:"The death of fire is the birth of air, and the death of air is the birth of water" here, Heraclitus explains that one element does not just spontaneously come into being, but it comes from another element. Not only do elements come from other elements, but some things that we might consider immaterial, like soul, as Heraclitus says in B76b: "For souls it is death to become water, for water death to become earth, but from earth water is born, and from water soul."[7] His fragments most clearly describe the mechanics of Heraclitean Flux, the exchange from one state of being into another; fire and soul are equated, quenched by and turned into water then into earth and back again, material and immaterial. Each element on opposite ends which bleed into one another in the same way that the road is both up and down and the beginning and end of a circle are common. When moving in a circle, any beginning point is a later destination, this is how Heraclitus portrays his Flux; within the earth fire is dead, in fire the earth is dead too, each are just destinations on the circle.

Katabasis

Heraclitean Flux does not work only on the basis of its own merits; it requires a balance maintained by primeval personifications of retributive justice known as the Furies. Heraclitus writes, "the sun being by its own nature the size of a human foot, will not overstep [his measures]; for if [he does] overstep his breadth, the Furies, the ministers of Justice, will find him out."[8] These "measures" give balance to the universe and don't allow fire to overly consume. The slowing of consumption is essential to the process of Heraclitus' Cycle, and it also explains how although there is a constant flux of one material into another, we can exist and experience opposite forces in a material continuum. Each element must exchange and change into another material. The Furies are the perfect balance to the Sun, as while the

5 ibid, 161, B103.
6 ibid, 157, B90.
7 Alternate versions come to us through Plutarch and Marcus Aurelius: See Graham, 155, B76b, B76c "The death of fire is the birth of air, and the death of air is the birth of water." -Plutarch On the E at Delphi B36:"For souls it is death to become water, for water death to become earth, but from earth water is born, and from water soul." Graham, 155, B76c: " It is death for earth to become water, and death for water to become air, and death for air to become fire and contrariwise" -Marcus Aurelius
8 The Derveni Papyrus IV, lines 6-8.

Sun correlates to heat and fire, the Furies are goddesses of justice associated with the cold earth, the opposite end of the cycle in Flux.

The Furies are what the Ancient Greeks called Chthonic gods, from the word χθόνιος [9] (*khthonios*) meaning "in, under or beneath the earth." They are often presented as such, most famously being called upon by the Ghost of Clytaemnestra in The Eumenides by Aeschylus where she refers to them as "goddesses of the earth":

> Hear me, I am pleading for my life.
>
> Awake my Furies, goddesses of the earth! [115]
>
> A dream is calling - Clytaemnestra calls you now.[10]

The Furies are called upon to right a wrong in the world, in the quote above the ghost of Clytaemnestra awakens them to avenge her murder referring to them through their point of origination, goddesses of *the earth*. The Furies in this way are personifications both of actions taking revenge for a wrong, thus retributive justice, but they are also associated with the earth in that in order for them to serve their role in upholding justice, they must come from their home in the earth. Both of these aspects are represented in the Heraclitus Fragments from the Derveni Papyri. They are both "ministers of Justice" as well as a limitation on the Sun, not allowing him to "overstep his measures" As ministers of Justice they are what maintain the Cycle and maintain the balance of his system.[11] This is why for Heraclitus, it is of the utmost importance to use the Furies; underworld goddesses of earth and retributive justice, to balance the Sun, the bringer of day and heat. They alone are suited to demonstrate this balance of Earth in opposition to Fire and complete the cycle of Heraclitian flux. The Furies are not the only Chthonic gods which Heraclitus mentions by name; he also mentions Thanatos (Death), Hypnos (Sleep) and Hades along with the demi-chthonic Dionysus, all gods of the Underworld.[12] Though none of the other gods are associated with Justice in the same way as the Furies, they still find their way into the Heraclitean Cycle and out of the Underworld. Each of these gods are similar in one way; *leaving* the Underworld is central to each of their Mythologies. Thanatos and Hypnos leave the underworld in Homer's *Iliad*, Hades abducts Persephone in the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*, and Dionysus leaves the underworld in the finale of the comic play *Frogs* by Aristophanes.[13]

Although The Furies, Thanatos, Hypnos and Hades are shown in ancient sources to be able to leave the underworld, both entering and

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9 Henry George Liddell et al., *A Greek-English Lexicon: With a Revised Supplement*, 1996.
10 Aeschylus and Robert Fagles, "Eumenides, Lines 114-116," in *The Oresteia*, 1984. ἀκούσαθ' ὡς ἔλεξα τῆς ἐμῆς περὶ /ψυχῆς, φρονήσατ', ὦ κατὰ χθονὸς θεαί. /ὅναρ γὰρ ὑμᾶς νῦν Κλυταιμήστρα καλῶ.
11 Graham, 163, F56.
12 ibid.,169, B21. 169, B26. 179, B15.
13 Homer, "Homeric Hymn to Demeter," trans. Gregory Nagy, The Center for Hellenic Studies, March 2, 2021,, Lines 425-435.
Homer, *The Iliad*, trans. Peter Green, 2015, Book XIV Lines; 675-683.

leaving the underworld was uncommon for most gods. This is exemplified with Dionysos who is shown in Aristophanes' *Frogs* calling on his half-brother Heracles for instruction on which road leads to the Underworld.[14] Heracles discourages him from even attempting by repying: "Well, let me see, which shall I tell you first, which one? / There's one starting with a cord and stool, / Just hang yourself!" What Aristophanes seems to show us is that entering the underworld *and* leaving was tricky for Mortals as well as Immortals.[15] A notable exception would be Hermes who is, although being considered a god of roads, travel, and shepherding the dead to the underworld. Hermes, is notably absent in Heraclitus' fragments. Thanatos, Hypnos, the Furies, and on one occasion Hades, however all seem to be able to leave the underworld with relative ease.

The Chthonic twins Thanatos and Hypnos are most frequently shown in ancient sources leaving and entering the underworld. In the Heraclitean fragments the two are often mentioned alongside one another and compared.[16] Ancient sources show them like the Furies, entering and emerging from the underworld, but more strikingly than the Furies, Thanatos and Hypnos' movements are constant rather than reactive, both through a Heraclitean reading and a broader mythological reading. Heraclitus says in fragment B21: "Death is whatever we see awake, whatever we see asleep is sleep." In other words, while the Furies only emerge from the underworld if either the Sun oversteps his measures, or if awakened and spurred into action like in *Eumenides*; the Twins, on the other hand, being personifications of death and sleep, are ever present and able to leave the Underworld at any time, Death, Thanatos, being what we see while we are awake, but while sleeping all we see is Sleep, Hypnos. The movement which the twins demonstrate reveal a second level to reading Heraclitus: even when the fragments mention Sleep and Death, it all feeds into the Heraclitean Flux; in other words, even the Underworld can be considered impermanent and in flux. The gods present in the Underworld, a place of death, are capable of movement into the world of life.

Changing it rests

Ancient Greece and the mediterranean region writ large had a number of religious groups which are referred to as Mystery Cults. The term Mystery Cult originates from the Greek word "μυστήριον" meaning "mystery or secret rite."[17] The three most major of these cults were The Eleusinian Mysteries, the Orphics, and the Pythagoreans. Although they

14 Aristophanes, *Frogs and Other Plays*, trans. Stephen Halliwell, 2016, Frogs 107-164.
15 Heracles during his 12 tasks, Odysseus entering the underworld, Theseus entering with Peirithoos to abduct Persephone, and Orpheus to bring his wife back from the dead.
16 Graham,163, B88: "As the same thing in us are living and dead, waking and sleeping, young and old. For these things having changed around are those, and those in turn having changed around are these." and ibid.,169, B21: "Death is whatever we see awake, whatever we see asleep is sleep."
17 *Greek-English Lexicon: With a Revised Supplement*.

differed greatly in the application of their faith, the Mystery Cults were similar in that they all posited an eternal spirit and afterlife, guaranteeing perpetual existence for the soul after death; for them there was no longer flux after death.

The Eleusinian Mysteries were a series of festivals and rituals hosted by the cult of Demeter at Eleusis, in Attica and northwest of the City of Athens. They were perhaps the most important festivals in the Ancient Greek world, and if we are to trust Strabo, Heraclitus may have been familiar with the "Rites of Eleusinian Demeter."[18] Little is known about what the actual practices of the cult were, as writing them down or revealing them to non-initiates was forbidden.[19] However what we can glean from the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* are that core tenets revolved around the abduction of Persephone into the Underworld by the Chthonic god Hades. Her mother, the Nature Goddess, Demeter searches for her, turning the world into a perpetual winter. Eventually Persephone returns to the world above, with the result that spring comes.[20] While we do not know all of the details for the Eleusinian Mysteries, we can see that there is a great focus on the concept of death and the afterlife. This is explicit in Aristophanes *Frogs*, where, after making it to the underworld Dionysos witnesses a Chorus of jubilant dead sing praises to "Demeter, mistress of our Holy Rites" and Iacchus, "deviser of our festal song."[21] The initiates are depicted singing and dancing and marching towards "flowery meadows" in the typically shadowy and bleak underworld filled with blood-drinking, miserable shades.[22] This shows us what awaits the initiated in the afterlife: rewards for their ritual participation in bacchic revelry.

Dionysos finds his way into the Eleusinian Mysteries as the aforementioned Iacchus, who may have began his existence as a separate god, but was synchronized into an aspect of Dionysus by the Classical period. The playwright Sophocles even gives Iacchus one of the attributes of Dionysus, his rentinue of Maenads: "[...] with due companionship of maenads dancing /and honoring their lord, Iacchus."[23] In other words, the Mytholo gy of Dionysos is messy, comprising thousands of lines of poetry and cen-

18 Graham,139, A2: "[Pherecydes] says Androclus was in charge of the Ionian Colonization, which was later than the Aeolian, being the legitimate son of Codrus king of Athens, and he was the founder of Ephesus. That is why they say, the royal seat of the Ionians was established there, and even now the descendants of this family are called kings, receiving certain honors: a front row seat at the games, a purple robe as insignia of the royal family, a staff instead of a scepter, and the rites of Eleusian Demeter."
19 Aeschylus was accused of revealing some aspects of the Mysteries and later acquitted.
20 *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*, 425-435.
21 *Frogs,* 399-455.
22 Homer and Peter Green, "Book XXI," in *The Odyssey*.
23 Sophocles, "Antigone," in *Sophocles I*, ed. David Grene et al., 2013, 62-63, lines 1116-1150.

turies of worship all throughout the Hellenic world.[24] Perhaps the most consistent and common theme is his strange birth. The most common myth is that he was sewn up and birthed out of his father Zeus' leg after the death of his mother Semele.[25] Much like there are alternate names for Dionysos, there are alternate stories of his birth Zeus and Persephone being the parents of Dionysos is the most dominant myth within another Mystery cult—the Orphics. The Orphics were a cult defined by their literary tradition, that is they were followers and readers of poems composed by the Legendary Heroic-Age singer Orpheus.[26] Unlike the initiates of Eleusinian Mysteries, the Orphics believed in perpetual reincarnation through the "wheel of birth" until an escape was found through an ascetic vegetarian life, and perhaps the use of a "totenpass" or gold tablet with instructions detailing escaping the wheel. Dionysos-Zagreus is a major figure in Orphic myth and whose story is central to Orphic ritual. Zagreus, the child of Zeus and Persephone is brought to Olympos, Hera is enraged by this and gets the Titans to lure the child with toys, where they tear him apart and eat his flesh. Zeus kills the Titans with lightning bolts, and their ashes turn into humans (earthly flesh of titans, immortal soul-stuff of Zagreus). Zeus takes the heart of Zagreus and either sews it up into his own leg or feeds the heart to the human Semele either way giving birth to the god Dionysos. This rebirth is at the heart of Orphic belief, serving as an explanation for the trap of the wheel of birth.

The Orphics were not the only cult to believe in an immortal soul. Pythagoras and his followers were another mystery cult who believed in the "transmigration of souls" which is preserved in fragment B7 of Xenophanes.[27] The "transmigration of souls" was a state of perpetual reincarnation, very similar to the "wheel of birth" in the Orphic Mysteries. The two cults are even compared in antiquity by Herodotus describing Orphic and Bacchic beliefs as "really Egyptian and Pythagorean." The same is seen in Diogenes Laertius : "Ion of Chios says [...] that [Pythagoras] composed some poems and attributed them to Orpheus".[28] In both of these instances the relationship between Pythagorism and Orphism is demonstrated to be poorly understood, even in antiquity. The Orphics were defined by the poems of Orpheus, some of which are still extant in written works, the Pythagoreans passed down knowledge

24 The *Dionysiaca* of Nonnus is the longest surviving ancient epic poem at 20,426 lines, its composition is post Christianity. Early evidence of Dionysos comes down to us through the Mycenaean Period in Linear B script as "*di-wo-nu-su-jo.*"
25 Herodotus, *Histories* 2.146.2.
26 Orpheus was an Argonaut, and an incredible musician. He is famous for going into the underworld to bring back his wife (either Eurydice or Argiope) from Hades; he was also considered by some traditions to be the inventor of writing.
27 "And once when [Pythagoras] was passing a puppy being beaten/ They say he took pity and said this word:/Cease beating him; for surely it is the soul of a friend /Which I recognised when I heard it howling!" Graham, 107, B7.
28 Herodotus 2.81.1-2

through the secret ακούσματα or "things heard."[29] Both cults would agree with the notion of an immortal soul, however the Orphics seek to escape the transmigration of souls, where the Pythagoreans seem to merely conclude that reincarnation into perpetuity is the natural order of the universe. In other words, the souls of the dead, for the Pythagoreans, could return in the form of animals and plants, but the Orphic foundation myth limits immortality of souls to humans.[30] As such, the "transmigration of souls" was much more fluid and inclusive than that of the Orphic "wheel of birth."

All of the Mysteries are at odds with the Flux of Heraclitus, as they posit a cessation of movement or, in other words, they posit a permanent state of the soul. For Heraclitus, eternal bliss in the underworld from the Eleusinians or Orphics would break the system of balance as would the perpetual reincarnation of both the Orphics and the Pythagoreans. With each generation more and more souls would be stuck in the afterlife and regardless of who they worshiped in life they still die. Heraclitus addresses this in fragment B15: "For if it were not to Dionysos that they were a procession and sang a hymn to the genitals, they would act most disgracefully. But Hades and Dionysos, for whom they madly celebrate the bacchic rites, are the same." This fragment seems to say that death is death, Dionysos and Hades are the same and the madness adopted by the initiates is madness in that they have deceived themselves. It is not only the deception but the means of the deception which Heraclitus finds to be a problem. The Soul for Heraclitus is equated with fire, which means that one can experience death of the soul as well as the body. Heraclitus says: "It is joy for souls to become wet [...] we live the death of them and they live our death."[31] The disembodied soul can experience joy in becoming "wet" when they become wet they are embodied and born. In this way, the disembodied soul has died and become an embodied human being. Unfortunately that does not guarantee any afterlife for an Initiate of Heraclitus. One needs to maintain the "dryness" of the soul as well. "When a man is drunk he is led by an immature boy, stumbling, not perceiving where he goes, with a wet soul."[32] Soul-death for Heraclitus is the quenching of the soul if one's soul becomes too wet through excessive use of alcohol, the medium of Bacchic revelry. Like Fire, the soul becomes less and less like itself as it becomes more wet and more like water. According to the Flux of Heraclitus this is the death of the soul and the birth of water. Soul-death is avoided by maintaining the "dryness," of the fire from which the soul is made. Bacchic revelry of the Eleusinian or Orphic Mysteries fly in the face of Heraclitean Flux in their permanence.

What of the Pythagoreans? The more inclusive outlook seems to be in line with what Heraclitus argues for flux and soul, since there is always a flow from one state of life into another. Heraclitus' problem with the Pythagoreans is different from those of the other Mysteries.

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29 *Greek-English Lexicon: With a Revised Supplement*
30 Legumes were forbidden from the diets of the Pythagoreans.
31 Graham, 169, B77.
32 ibid., 169, B117.

Where the Orphics or Eleusinian Mysteries posit some sort of end, the Pythagorean "transmigration of souls" is a movement of the soul from one body immediately into another after death. The Pythagoreans do not pose any sort of afterlife because there is no movement between elements, the soul simply moves into the next life. A life whose material outcomes would be more favorable considering that The Pythagoreans had rituals in place attempting to allow for good fortune in rebirth after death.[33] Not only does this disagree with the Heraclitean notion of the death of the soul, but also pushes against Heraclitus'need to maintain a "dry" soul. Otherwise the "dryness" of the soul is stuck in one plane, constantly reborn life after life eternally, and disallowing for the material flux of Heraclitus.

The Mysteries run counter to Heraclitus' Flux. The immortal soul present in each of them unbalances what Heraclitus see's as the cycle of flux. Within the Heraclitean fragments balance is upheld proportionally; Fire, Water, and Earth exchanging material "stuff" under the watchful eyes of the Furies to maintain balance and harmony in the world. For Heraclitus the initiates of the Mysteries don't understand balance and run counter to the truth of the world as he understands it. They do not understand Flux and Change insofar as they present the soul as permanent, either celebrating death in the Underworld or flitting from life, to life, to life. They are merely, as he says in fragment B14, "night-wanderers, magi, Bacchants, Lenaeans, and initiates celebrating Mysteries in an unholy manner."[34] In other words, they are charlatans who fail to fulfill the promises that they make to their initiates. Heraclitus believes that his manner of life, devoid of mysteries and alcohol, is the only way to achieve a life beyond mortality, in the dryness of one's soul, not in the permanence of an underworld. Otherwise all else is Flux.

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33 See Charles Khan, *Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans*, 21.
34 Graham, 179, B14

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